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FLANAGAN'S WAKE: NEWSGATHERERS
NAVIGATE UNCERTAIN WATERS FOLLOWING
FLANAGAN V. FLANAGAN
Gary L. Bostwick* and Jean-Paul Jassy**
I. INTRODUCTION
It is possible to keep things quiet. By choosing to speak or act, one is
choosing to expose his or her thoughts, beliefs, and emotions. Recordings
of such activities can capture words- good or bad-and preserve them in
time. Recordings offer truth in a way that minimizes ambiguity and settles
dispute. Recordings bring life to dialogues, movements, and moments in a
way that interpretation, recollection, and hearsay never could. Recordings
can root out terrorist plans, shine light on corruption among politicians, and
expose unhealthy food preparation techniques at a supermarket.
Recordings, however, make people uncomfortable.
A few months ago, the California Supreme Court handed down
Flanagan v. Flanagan,1 a much-anticipated decision evaluating California
Penal Code section 632,2 California's anti-eavesdropping and anti-
recording statute. The decision settled a split in the intermediate appellate
courts about the meaning of the term "confidential communication." The
decision did not, however, involve a matter of public interest, and did not
involve media-related activities. Accordingly, Flanagan had no occasion
to weigh competing principles: namely, the developing recognition of
privacy rights against the well-established right of the press to obtain and
report newsworthy information.
*Gary L. Bostwick is a partner of Davis Wright Tremaine LLP and a Fellow of the American
College of Trial Lawyers. Specializing in general litigation with a focus on media defense, he
was granted a Master's of Public Policy in 1976 from the University of California Berkeley and a
J.D. from the University of Califomia/Boalt Hall in 1977. He has litigated many leading
defamation and privacy cases in the past two decades.
.. Jean-Paul Jassy is an associate of Davis Wright Tremaine LLP. He focuses his practice on
First Amendment and media litigation and has litigated several cases involving hidden cameras
and California Penal Code section 632.
1. 41 P.3d 575 (Cal. 2002).
2. CAL. PENAL CODE § 632 (West 1999).
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Flanagan, and the statute that it addressed, are recent additions to a
long line of constitutional, common law, and statutory concerns over
privacy. This Article provides the background and limitations on
eavesdropping and recording laws, and their relationship to the
jurisprudence of privacy. The Flanagan decision is then dissected from an
historical, linguistic, and analytical perspective. The flaws in Flanagan's
reasoning and conclusions are abundant, and the importance of narrowly
interpreting that decision cannot be overstated.
Since Flanagan did not force the court to weigh competing
constitutional concerns, its wake has left choppy waters. However, if and
when another court is faced with principles that directly conflict with the
notions of privacy embedded in anti-recording statutes, then judges will
need to make a choice. Either the inherent value in recordings and their
ability to offer truth- shedding light on important issues will be recognized,
or vague notions of "privacy" for privacy's sake will harm the best interests
of society in the dissemination of truthful, important, and potentially vital
information. Let us hope that the courts chose wisely.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Why Are There Legal Restrictions on Eavesdropping?
In thinking about privacy, its separate strands must not be intermixed.
The right of privacy is not a monolithic concept. Anyone who seeks to
thoughtfully analyze the urge to erect and maintain laws governing
eavesdropping by the press must discriminate between and among other
rights of privacy that serve other purposes. The policy debate about
eavesdropping is not derivative of urges that have found expression in the
Fourth Amendment,3 the Fifth Amendment,4 the constitutional bans upon
incursions into fundamental personal autonomy and intimate choices, 5 the
3. See ELLEN ALDERMAN & CAROLINE KENNEDY, THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY 152 (1995).
The idea of man in control of his own private sphere has always been a basic
organizing principle of American society. At America's birth, we adopted from our
English ancestors the belief that a man's home is his castle and that man is king of
that domain and, by extension, the whole of his private life. The Bill of Rights was
drafted to limit government interference in people's lives.
Id.
4. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) ("The Fifth Amendment in its
Self-Incrimination Clause enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy which government may
not force him to surrender to his detriment.").
5. See id. at 486-87 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
[T]he concept of liberty protects those personal rights that are fundamental, and is
not confined to the specific terms of the Bill of Rights. My conclusion that the
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right of publicity, 6 the restrictions on collection and publication of data
about a person,7 the California Constitution's guarantee of a right of
privacy, or the tort of false light invasion of privacy. 9 Behavior that our
concept of liberty is not so restricted and that it embraces the right of marital
privacy though that right is not mentioned explicitly in the Constitution is
supported both by numerous decisions of this Court, referred to in the Court's
opinion, and by the language and history of the Ninth Amendment.
Id. (footnote omitted). In another landmark case, the Court said:
In a line of decisions, however, going back perhaps as far as [1891], the Court has
recognized that a right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones
of privacy, does exist under the Constitution.... [Diecisions make it clear that
only personal rights that can be deemed 'fundamental' or 'implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty,' are included in this guarantee of personal privacy.... This right of
privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal
liberty and restrictions upon state action, as we feel it is, or, as the District Court
determined, in the Ninth Amendment's reservation of rights to the people, is broad
enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her
pregnancy.
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152, 153 (1973) (citations omitted).
6. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344(a) (West 1997) ("Any person who knowingly uses
another's name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness, in any manner.... for purposes of
advertising or selling,. . . without such person's prior consent, .. . shall be liable for any damages
sustained by the person or persons injured as a result thereof."); Wendt v. Host Int'l, Inc., 971
F.2d 1284, 1285 (9th Cir. 1999) (Kozinski, J., dissenting from the order rejecting the petition for
rehearing en banc in a matter in which the actors who played the parts of Norm and Cliff in the
popular television series Cheers objected to being depicted as robots in airport bars) ("Robots
again. In White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1999 (9th Cir. 1992), we held that
the right of publicity extends not just to the name, likeness, voice and signature of a famous
person, but to anything at all that evokes that person's identity.").
7. See, e.g., Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2000) (governing the collection, storing,
and sharing of personal data by federal agencies); Privacy Protection for Rape Victims Act of
1978, 28 U.S.C. app. § 412 (2000) (modifying Federal Rule of Evidence 412 in 1994 to safeguard
the alleged victim against the invasion of privacy, potential embarrassment, and sexual
stereotyping that is associated with public disclosure of intimate sexual details, and also against
the infusion of sexual innuendo into the fact-finding process); Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15
U.S.C. § 1681 (2000) (requiring that consumer reporting agencies adopt reasonable procedures
for meeting the needs of commerce for consumer credit, personnel, insurance, and other dealings
with fairness, impartiality, and a respect for the consumer's right to privacy).
8. See Cal. Const. art. I, § 1; Hill v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 865 P.2d 633 (Cal.
1994) (holding that intercollegiate athletic association's drug testing policy involving monitoring
of urination, testing of urine samples, and inquiry concerning medication did not violate
constitutional right to privacy under the California Constitution). The court cited language in
favor of Proposition 11, a privacy measure to amend the California Constitution:
The right of privacy.., prevents government and business interests from collecting
and stockpiling unnecessary information about us and from misusing information
gathered for one purpose in order to serve other purposes or to embarrass us.
[I]... The proliferation of government and business records over which we have
no control limits our ability to control our personal lives.... [I] Even more
dangerous is the loss of control over the accuracy of government and business
records on individuals....
Id. at 642 (citing BALLOT PAMPHLET, PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE CALIFORNIA
CONSTITUTION WITH ARGUMENTS TO VOTERS, GENERAL ELECTION (NOVEMBER 7, 1972) 26-27
(1972)).
4 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:1
society seeks to protect by restrictions and proscriptions in those areas
differs so much from behavior regulated by laws relating to private
eavesdropping and recording that it is not only useless to invoke those
doctrines to help regulate the latter, but doing so could even be labeled
misguided.
Rules against eavesdropping do seek to control and restrict some of
the same behavior as the common law torts of intrusion and publication of
private facts, torts most clearly delineated in California in the Supreme
Court's opinions in Shulman v. Group W Productions, Inc.,'0 and Sanders
v. ABC, Inc.'1 There, microphones, recordings, unsuspecting speakers, and
broadcasts of recorded matter were at issue just as plainly as in a case
brought against news gatherers for a violation of Penal Code section 632.
Professor Robert C. Post, in a law review article, argues that the
common law tort of invasion of privacy safeguards social norms, which he
calls "rules of civility that in significant measure constitute both individual
and community" identity .12 The tort, he says, is predicated upon an
"interdependence between persons and social life ... that ... makes
possible a certain kind of human dignity and autonomy which can exist
only within the embrace of community norms.' ' 3 Violation of these norms,
then, injures both personality and human dignity. 14 Professor Post seeks to
illuminate the tort, which regulates unreasonable intrusion, by considering
an early case where a landlord installed an eavesdropping device in a
couple's bedroom.' 5 The plaintiff husband there alleged that, as a result of
9. See M.G. v. Time Warner, Inc., 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d 504 (Ct. App. 2001) (affirming trial
court's refusal to dismiss suit by players and assistant coaches on youth baseball team whose
manager had pled guilty to charges of child molestation asserting invasion of privacy claims
against defendants Sports Illustrated and HBO, who had shown a picture of the team to illustrate
stories about adult coaches who molest youths playing team sports).
A 'false light' claim, like libel, exposes a person to hatred, contempt, ridicule, or
obloquy and assumes the audience will recognize it as such. In the article and the
program, defendants communicated the clear message that Watson had
continuously molested the members of his Little League team until he was
unmasked in September 1997. Although Watson's victims, except for one young
man who volunteered to be interviewed for the program, cannot be identified
specifically, the article and the program could reasonably be interpreted as
reporting that some or all the players in the photograph had been molested by
Watson. Plaintiffs, therefore, have stated a 'false light' claim."
Id. at 514-15.
10. 955 P.2d 469 (Cal. 1998).
11. 978 P.2d 67 (Cal. 1999).
12. Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self in the Common
Law Tort, 77 CAL. L. REV. 957, 959 (1989).
13. Id.
14. See id.
15. Id. (discussing Hamburger v. Eastman, 206 A.2d 239 (N.H. 1964)).
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the discovery of the eavesdropping device, he was "greatly distressed,
humiliated, and embarrassed," and "ha[d] sustained.., intense and severe
mental suffering and distress, and ha[d] been rendered extremely nervous
and upset[.]' 16  The wife's suit was identical.' 7  The New Hampshire
Supreme Court held that that type of intrusion "would be offensive to any
person of ordinary sensibilities."'
18
Post makes an attempt to distinguish between two kinds of plaintiff
interests that are relevant to eavesdropping cases:
The first arises because of contingent psychological injuries that
plaintiffs may suffer as a result of the violation of civility rules.
Mental anguish and humiliation are examples of such injuries
that are common and routine.... The second kind of interest
arises from the dignitary harm which plaintiffs suffer as a result
of having been treated disrespectfully. Violations of civility
rules are intrinsically demeaning, even if not experienced as
such by a particular plaintiff. This is because dignitary harm
does not depend on the psychological condition of an individual
plaintiff, but rather on the forms of respect that a plaintiff is
entitled to received from others.' 9
Some authors and thinkers call eavesdropping wrong for the most
simple of reasons: It is wrong because it is wrong. "It is prima facie wrong
to observe a person against his will at any time, because it violates his
autonomous right to decide whether he will be observed or not., 20 This
view appears to have found currency in the California Supreme Court's
opinion in Flanagan v. Flanagan.
2 1
It also may be said that the proscriptions upon eavesdropping arise
out of the natural sense that there is a right "to be let alone., 22 Although
frequently and mistakenly credited for coining the term, Warren and
Brandeis popularized the phrase in their much-cited law review article,23
complaining of a state of affairs that was known to them in a different time
using different devices: "Instantaneous photographs and newspaper
16. Hamburger, 206 A.2d at 240.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 242.
19. Post, supra note 12, at 966-67 (footnotes omitted).
20. See, e.g., Robert S. Gerstein, Intimacy and Privacy, in PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF
PRIVACY: AN ANTHOLOGY 267 (Ferdinand David Schoeman ed. 1984).
21. See Flanagan, 41 P.3d at 580-82.
22. THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 18, at 34 (4th ed. 1932).
23. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193
(1890).
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enterprise have invaded the sacred precincts of private and domestic life;
and numerous mechanical devices threaten to make good the prediction
that 'what is whispered in the closet shall be proclaimed from the
housetops.' '2 4  The Article goes on, in words echoed in ever-increasing
numbers of articles, comments, treatises, and opinions: "The press is
overstepping in every direction the obvious bounds of propriety and of
decency. Gossip is no longer the resource of the idle and of the vicious, but
has become a trade, which is pursued with industry as well as effrontery."
25
Pertinent to the eavesdropping debate, Warren and Brandeis went on to say
that "[t]he common law secures to each individual the right of determining,
ordinarily, to what extent his thoughts, sentiments, and emotions shall be
communicated to others. 26
One professor of philosophy has distilled the concept of privacy down
to an elemental idea that, in its simplicity and common sense, is perhaps
more helpful than any other in the debate about secret recording by news
gatherers.27  He posits that certain things about each of our lives are
"nobody else's business."28 Continuing, he writes:
This, I think, is an extremely important point. We have a 'sense
of privacy' which is violated in such affairs, and this sense of
24. Id. at 195.
25. Id. at 196.
26. Id. at 198. Not all reviewers have found the article so impressive. In 1979, the Director
and Counsel of the Massachusetts Special Legislative Commission on Privacy, James H. Barron,
published a law review article critically analyzing the traditional views of the origin of Warren
and Brandeis' article, finding them exaggerated, tenuously related to fact, even apocryphal.
James H. Barron, Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890):
Demystifying a Landmark Citation, 13 SUFF. U. L. REV. 875 (1979). He suggests instead that the
hypersensitivity of Warren and ambivalent views of Brandeis toward the concept of privacy and
the function of the press distorted their perceptions of press treatment of the Boston upper classes.
See id. at 907-14. Barron takes delight in debunking earlier statements by Harry Kalven and
Dean Prosser to the affect that the impetus for the article came from Warren's irritation over the
way the press covered the wedding of his daughter in 1890. See id. at 891-94. According to
Barron's genealogical study, newspaper accounts of the time and other sources, Warren was
married only once and his first daughter was born in 1884. See id. at 893. "[T]he girl would have
been no more than seven-years old when Warren and Brandeis wrote the article." Id. Barron
goes on to point out that both Warren and Brandeis were associated with the Mugwump
movement of the 1880s, and the message and the tone of their article is similar to the self-
righteous moralism expressed by contemporary Mugwumps, sharing in some degree a conviction
common to the educated mind of their day: a certainty of moral as well as intellectual superiority
over the surrounding populace. Id. at 915. Professor Kalven earlier weighed in against the
article, finding the tort proposed both petty and anachronistic. Kalven, Privacy in Tort Law-
Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 326, 329 & n.22 (1966).
27. James Rachels, Why Privacy Is Important, in PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF
PRIVACY: AN ANTHOLOGY 290 (Ferdinand David Schoeman ed., 1984).
28. Id. at 292 (e.g., a woman's sex life).
2002] FLANAGAN'S WAKE: NEWSGATHERERS FACE UNCERTAIN FUTURE 7
privacy cannot adequately be explained merely in terms of our
fear of being embarrassed or disadvantaged in... obvious ways.
An adequate account of privacy should help us to understand
what makes something 'someone's business' and why intrusions
into things that are 'none of your business' are, as such,
offensive."
29
B. The Nub of the Debate: How to Recognize What Is My Business and
What Is Strictly Yours
This observation gives clear voice to something we all know to be
true, viz, a person may want to keep some things from us and by labeling
them "confidential" or "private" to buttress their right to keep them from
us. Still, they may be very much "our business." Conduct that is harmful to
our societal interests is "our business" and no conscionable theory of
privacy can ignore taking that potential into account. Someone committing
a crime or planning to kill or physically harm someone or to seriously
damage their interests is something we would all seek to prevent, even at
the cost of that potential perpetrator's "privacy."
This is not a new concept in governance and law. Laws dealing with
other areas of secrecy and confidentiality carve out clear exceptions to
important rules guarding confidentiality in order to protect others in
society. For instance, the psychotherapist-patient privilege not only can be
breached by the therapist,30 it must be breached in certain circumstances:
There is no privilege under this article if the psychotherapist has
reasonable cause to believe that the patient is in such mental or
emotional condition as to be dangerous to himself or to the
person or property of another and that disclosure of the
communication is necessary to prevent the threatened danger.3'
The California Supreme Court has held that the psychotherapist-
patient privilege is "an aspect of the patient's constitutional right to
privacy." 32 In spite of that exalted rank, "the right to privacy is not
absolute, but may yield in the furtherance of compelling state interests.
' 3
In Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California,34 the California Supreme
Court, dealing with a therapist's duties with respect to a dangerous patient,
29. Id.
30. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1024 (West 1995).
31. Id.
32. People v. Stritzinger, 668 P.2d 738, 742 (Cal. 1983).
33. Id.
34. 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976).
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held that the heirs of a murder victim could bring a wrongful death action
against the therapists who failed to warn the victim. 35 In reaching this
result, it described the Evidence Code provisions as "balancing the
countervailing concerns" by establishing a "broad rule of privilege to
protect confidential communications between patient and psychotherapist"
in section 1014 and a "specific and limited exception" in section 1024.36
The Court found that a violation of the confidentiality that the patient
relied upon had to take a back seat in certain circumstances, difficult as
they might be to gauge:
The risk that unnecessary warnings may be given is a reasonable
price to pay for the lives of possible victims that may be saved.
We would hesitate to hold that the therapist who is aware that
his patient expects to attempt to assassinate the President of the
United States would not be obligated to warn the authorities
because the therapist cannot predict with accuracy that his
37patient will commit the crime.
Similarly, therapists also are compelled to violate the privilege by
reporting known or suspected incidents of child abuse under the Child
Abuse and Neglect Reporting Act.38
Likewise, all attorneys are-or should be-familiar with the crime-
fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege. Balancing of contrary
interests is once again at work in that rule: .... There is no privilege under
this article if the services of the lawyer were sought or obtained to enable
or aid anyone to commit or plan to commit a crime or a fraud."",,
39
Balancing never can be accomplished by the use of inflexible
proclamations of what is "confidential," particularly when the standard
fails to take into account that a great many things that are being said should
indeed be our business. Using a strict rule, no balancing whatsoever takes
place. One of the foremost writers on privacy in the United States puts the
case for clear criteria in the following way:
If privacy is to receive its proper weight on the scales in any
process of balancing competing values, what is needed is a
structured and rational weighing process with definite criteria
that public and private authorities can apply in comparing the
claims for disclosure or surveillance through new devices with
35. Id. at 353.
36. See id. at 346-47.
37. Id. at 346.
38. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 11164-11173.3 (West 2000 & Supp. 2002).
39. CAL. EVID. CODE § 956 (West 1995).
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the claims to privacy.40
In Flanagan, at least in the context of private persons who are not
members of the press, no weighing is contemplated or allowed.4 1
"Confidentiality" does not receive its proper weight on the scales, taking
into account the semiotic variations of that term in a modem society.4 2
There is no weighing of important policy interests. The scales have been
destroyed. The only determination to be made is whether a person
reasonably and unilaterally believed someone was listening.4 3 If not,
society's interests, are ignored, an evaluative technique that is in stark
contrast to what the same court recently used so deftly in both the Shulman
and Sanders decisions.
C. The Right to Privacy in Other Jurisdictions
A federal statute provides penalties for recording conversations
without the permission of at least one party.4  The law has a specific
provision prohibiting the recording of an "oral communication," or an
utterance by one "exhibiting an expectation that such communication is not
subject to interception under circumstances justifying such expectation.
'45
The powerful exception in the federal law, from the perspective of news
gatherers, is the "one party" consent system, where any party (or person
with prior consent of a party) to a conversation can record the
conversation.4 6 The caveat to the exception, which has created a fair
amount of controversy, is that even the one-party recording may not be
done with a criminal or tortious purpose.47 Fortunately, the interpretation
of this caveat is not entirely circular-for example, the mere fact of taping
is not sufficient to show a criminal or tortious purpose.4 8
The federal statute is designed as a statutory minimum and does not
40. ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 370 (1967).
41. See Flanagan, 41 P.3d at 580 (explaining different standards that courts employ in
addressing issues of confidentiality).
42. See id.
43. See id.
44. 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (2000).
45. Id. § 2510(2).
46. Id. § 2511(2)(d).
47. Id. The statute also contained an "injurious purpose" qualifier, but the Sixth Circuit
ruled that phrase unconstitutionally ambiguous. Boddie v. ABC, Inc., 881 F.2d 267 (6th Cir.
1989). Some states that modeled their laws after the federal statute, however, still contain the
injurious purpose language. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 86-702(2)(b)-(c) (Michie 1999).
48. See, e.g., Deteresa v. ABC, Inc., 121 F.3d 460, 467 n.4 (stating that plaintiff failed to
show conversation was taped for the purpose of violating section 632, for the purpose of invading
her privacy, or for the purpose of committing unfair business practices).
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preempt or discourage states from developing stricter laws. 49 In fact, about
a dozen states, including California, do have stricter laws, requiring two-
party or all-party consent to the recording of conversations.50 Most states,
however, follow the federal model, and permit recordings under a one-
party consent system (often with caveats or qualifying language for
recordings done for the purpose of committing a criminal, tortious, or
injurious act). 5'
California courts recognize that "one who imparts private information
risks the betrayal of his confidence by the other party, 52 but, under its two-
party consent system, concludes that there is "a substantial
distinction.., between the secondhand repetition of the contents of a
49. See S. REP. No. 1097, at 2181, 2187, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2187.
Before 1986, the federal wiretapping law required all parties' consent to record a phone
conversation. See Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508,
§ 101(b), 100 Stat. 1848 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3571. Similarly, in 1999,
Delaware switched from an all-party consent system to a one-party consent system. Compare
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1336 (Michie 2001) with DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 2402(c)(4)
(Michie 2001); see also Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, I Spy: The Newsgatherer Undercover, 33
U. Rich. L. Rev. 1185, 1217 (2000).
50. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 632 et seq. (West 1999); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-570d
(2001); FLA. STAT. ch. 934.03 (2001); 702 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/14-1 et seq. (West 2001);
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. §§ 10-401 et seq. (Michie 1998); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.,
ch. 272 § 99 (West 2000); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8-213 (2000); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 570-
A:2 (Supp. 2001); OR. REV. STAT. § 165.540 (1999) (one-party consent for phone conversations,
two-party consent for any other conversation); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 5701 et seq. (West
2000); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 9.73.030 et seq. (West 1998).
51. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-11-30 (1994); ALASKA STAT. § 42.20.310 (Michie 1962);
ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3005 (West 2001); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 23-17-107, 5-60-120
(Michie 2002); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 18-9-303-18-9-305 (2001); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11,
§§ 2401 et seq. (Michie 2001); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 23-541 et seq. (1981); GA. CODE ANN.
§§ 16-11-60 et seq. (1998); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 803-41 et seq. (1993); IDAHO CODE §§ 18-6702
et seq. (Michie 1997); IND. CODE § 35-33.5-1 et seq. (1998); IOWA CODE § 727.8 (2001); KAN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 21-4001 et seq. (1995); State v. Roudybush, 686 P.2d 100 (Kan. 1984); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 526.010 (Michie 1999); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:1303 (West 1992); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 14, §§ 709-713 et seq. (West 1980); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750,539 (2001);
Sullivan v. Gray, 324 N.W.2d 58 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626A.01 et seq.
(West 1983); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 41-29-501 et seq. (1972); Mo. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 542.400
et seq. (1987); NEB. REV. STAT. § 86-702 (2000); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:156A-I et seq. (West
1985); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-12-1 (Michie 2002); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 250 et seq. (McKinney
2000); People v. Lasher, 58 N.Y.2d 962 (1983); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-287 (2002); N.D. CENT.
CODE §§ 12.1-15-02 et seq. (1997); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2933.51 et seq. (Anderson 1999);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §§ 176.1 et seq. (West 2002); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-35-21 (2000);
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-13-601 et seq. (1997); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 123.001
et seq. (Vernon 1997); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 16.02 (Vernon 1994); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-
9-401 et seq. (1999); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 19.2-61 et seq. (2000); W. VA. CODE §§ 62-1D-1 et seq.
(2000); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 968.31 (West 1998); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-3-602 (Michie 2001).
52. Frio v. Sup. Ct., 250 Cal. Rptr. 819, 822 (Ct. App. 1988) (citing Ribas v. Clark, 696
P.2d 637, 640 (Cal. 1985)).
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conversation and its simultaneous dissemination to an unannounced second
auditor, whether that auditor be a person or mechanical device." 53 States
operating under a one-party consent system focus more on the speaker's
choice to reveal certain matters to certain people and less on any purported
distinction between whether the contents of a conversation are revealed to
one person or to many.
Various courts explain that speakers must advance at their own peril
and, therefore, should not simply assume that their words are uttered
ephemerally. An appellate court in Michigan was asked to resolve an
ambiguity in Michigan's eavesdropping and wiretapping statute to
determine whether that state operated under a one-party or two-party
consent system. 54 The court concluded that Michigan was a one-party
consent state and carefully explained the difference between recording by a
party and recording by a third person that was not a party to the
conversation at all:
A recording made by a participant is nothing more than a more
accurate record of what was said. Whether an individual should
reasonably expect that an ostensibly private conversation will be
related by a participant to third parties depends on that
individual's relation to the other participant. The individual may
gauge his expectations according to his own evaluation of the
person to whom he speaks. He has the ability to limit what he
says based upon that expectation. When a third party is
unilaterally given permission to listen in upon a conversation,
unknown to other participants, those other participants are no
longer able to evaluate and form accurate expectations since
they are without knowledge of the third party. Therefore, it is
not inconsistent to permit a person to record and utilize
conversations he participates in yet deny him the right to
unilaterally grant that ability to third parties.55
The United States Supreme Court, interpreting federal law, explained
that "one party may not force the other to secrecy merely by using a
telephone. 56 A holding to the contrary, the Court explained, would mean
that "every secretary who listens to a business conversation at her
employer's direction in order to record it would be marked as a potential
53. Id.
54. Sullivan v. Gray, 324 N.W.2d 58 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982).
55. Id. at 60-61.
56. Rathbun v. United States, 355 U.S. 107, 110 (1957).
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federal criminal. 57 Other courts have followed this lead, explaining that
"[o]ne party to a telephone communication has no right to force the other to
secrecy, and, in fact, takes the risk that the other party may have an
extension telephone and may allow another to overhear the conversation.,
58
Another court declared that "[a]ny expectation of privacy in a telephone
conversation is not objectively reasonable, because a person is not
reasonably entitled to assume that no one is listening in on an extension
telephone. 59  These cases all fall within the context of telephone
communications, and so too did Flanagan, where the California Supreme
Court, coming to the opposite conclusion, held that the allegedly aggrieved
party had a reasonable expectation that he was not being overheard or
recorded.60
III. FRAMING THE ISSUE OF SECRET RECORDING BEFORE FLANAGAN
Framing a legal question is all-important. Semiotics is the study of
signs and symbols of all kinds, what they denote, and how they relate to the
tangible objects or ideas to which they refer. The question in this Article
is, What do we all mean, or better said, what do we want to mean, when we
write or speak the words "privacy" and "confidential" in the context of
secret recording of communications. Privacy-the right or expectation to
be able to draw a cloak around ourselves-takes many shapes and forms.
61
As new technology emerges making it more technically feasible for.
outsiders to lift that cloak, the definitions in the law change to reflect
changes in policy.
A. Fourth Amendment Privacy as Against the Government
United States courts began to deal with the new technology that
enabled the interception of communications as early as 1928. In Olmstead
v. United States,62 the Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment was
inapplicable to wiretapping because government officials had not
physically invaded the defendant's premises.63 The "seizure" of words had
57. Id. at 111.
58. Coates v. United States, 307 F. Supp. 677, 679 (E.D. Mo. 1970).
59. Commonwealth v. Eason, 694 N.E.2d 1264, 1268 (Mass. 1998).
60. Flanagan, 41 P.3d at 576.
61. See Gary L. Bostwick, Comment, A Taxonomy of Privacy: Repose, Sanctuary, and
Intimate Decision, 64 CAL. L. REV. 1447 (1976).
62. 277 U.S. 438 (1928), overruled in part by Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967) and
by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
63. See id. at 466.
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occurred outside the premises.64 The Court, applying the most simple and
clear-cut test it could find, relied upon a physical structure and traditions of
the Fourth Amendment's ban against "the king's men" in order to frame its
65definition of eavesdropping.
Congress, apparently not satisfied with that simplicity, responded. In
1934, it enacted the Federal Communications Act of 1934,66 framing the
issue such that "no person not being authorized by the sender shall
intercept any communication and divulge or publish [any aspect of the
communication]. 67  This language was an expansion of the
communications privacy concept. Whereas the Olmstead Court found
itself strictly confined within the four walls of a physical space, the
Communications Act recognized for the first time that because someone's
words now could carry beyond the confines of his own home, some
concept of a privacy zone that spread out along telephone wires was
appropriate.
Three years later in Nardone v. United States,68 the Supreme Court
faced a new question: Even considering that the law bans interception
generally, should law enforcement personnel be exempt? The answer was,
"No."69  Petitioners there were tried and convicted for smuggling,
possession, and concealment of alcohol on the basis of wiretapping
evidence.70 The Court stated:
It is urged that a construction be given the section which would
exclude federal agents since it is improbable Congress intended
to hamper and impede the activities of the government in the
detection and punishment of crime. The answer is that the
question is one of policy. Congress may have thought it less
important that some offenders should go unwhipped of justice
than that officers should resort to methods deemed inconsistent
with ethical standards and destructive of personal liberty. The
same considerations may well have moved the Congress to
adopt section 605 as evoked the guaranty against practices and
procedures violative of privacy, embodied in the Fourth and
64. See id. at 464.
65. See id. at 465. "
66. 47 U.S.C § 605 (1994). The language of the Act forbids anyone, unless authorized by
the sender, to intercept a telephone message and it further directs that "no person" shall divulge or
publish the message or its substance to "any person." See also 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2000).
67. 1d. § 605(a).
68. Nardone v. United State, 302 U.S. 379 (1937).
69. Id. at 382.
70. Id. at 380.
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Fifth Amendments of the Constitution.
71
The wiretap incident in Nardone had yet more to teach. Whereas the
first Nardone matter overruled convictions that were based upon admission
into evidence of incriminating conversations, the Supreme Court faced a
slightly different question when Nardone was convicted a second time.
72
The follow-up question was: Can evidence that has been gleaned only as a
result of the wiretapping be admissible to convict?73 Again, the answer
was, "No. 74 The Supreme Court returned to the well known assayer's
device common in constitutional analysis, balancing competing interests in
establishing public policy:
Any claim for the exclusion of evidence logically relevant in
criminal prosecutions is heavily handicapped. It must be
justified by an over-riding public policy expressed in the
Constitution or the law of the land. In a problem such as that
before us now, two opposing concerns must be harmonized: On
the one hand, the stem enforcement of the criminal law; on the
other, protection of that realm of privacy left free by the
Constitution and laws but capable of infringement either through
zeal or design.75
Both Nardone opinions use the word "privacy" and draw strength for
definition of the concept out of the United States Constitution. The Court
in one opinion makes specific reference to the Fourth Amendment (homes
free from search and seizure) and Fifth Amendment (no compelled self-
incrimination).76  The constitutional concepts all relate to the tense
relationship between citizens and their government, reflecting the
prevailing aims of the Bill of Rights, that acts of the sovereign shall be
curtailed in areas of vital personal liberty.
Of course, some things have changed since the early days of the
Republic. Tapping wires now is a relatively simply proposition from a
mechanical point of view. Listening devices represent a more sophisticated
technology, and advances in that area forced new questions before the
United States Supreme Court in a progression of cases. The Court first
focused on where the listening device was placed, that is, whether the
device was within a physical volume that historically was considered
71. Id. at 383.
72. Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939).
73. Id. at 339.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 340.
76. Nardone, 302 U.S. at 383.
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protected against intrusion by the government. 77 The Supreme Court, in
78three different cases, set rules regulating how far into a party wall a
listening device could be inserted before triggering Fourth Amendment
protections. The outcome: pressing a listening device against the wall
adjoining an office was no physical trespass and therefore constituted no
search,79 but driving a microphone into a party wall of a suspect's house is
a search, 80 even when the microphone was driven only thumbtack-deep. 81
All of the holdings regarding penetration of a wall find genesis in the
physical concepts of the Fourth Amendment and the libertarian concepts of
the Bill of Rights.
By the mid-1960s, technology and the debate had moved to whether a
search occurred if there was no physical intrusion into a so-called
"constitutionally protected area." In Katz v. United States,82 FBI agents
had placed a bug on the outside of a phone booth.83 There was no home;
there was no penetration of walls. The agents heard and recorded half of
the telephone conversations in which Katz exchanged wagering
information while in a telephone booth.84 Given the law's rather strict
reliance upon physical zones, it is not surprising that the litigants briefed
and argued the issue of whether a telephone booth was a "constitutionally
protected area." The Court "decline[d] to adopt this formulation of the
issues' 8 5 and the law progressed.
For the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a
person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home
or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But
what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible
to the public, may be constitutionally protected.
8 6
This formulation changed at once the denotative properties of the
word "privacy." What the Court said, in essence, was that if you
knowingly expose information to the "public," even if you are in the most
hallowed sanctuaries of the law-the home-the Fourth Amendment will
77. See Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 466.
78. Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S.
505 (1961); Clinton v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 158 (1964).
79. Goldman, 316 U.S. at 134.
80. Silverman, 365 U.S. at 505, 506.
81. Clinton, 377 U.S. at 158.
82. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
83. Id. at 348.
84. See id. at 354 n.14.
85. Id. at 350.
86. Id. at 351 (citations omitted).
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not protect you. However even if you are in a public place and plainly
visible in a phone booth like Katz, "what he sought to exclude when he
entered the booth was not the intruding eye -it was the uninvited ear.",
87
For the first time, privacy in the eavesdropping sense stepped outside the
home/office.
In charting the thinking on privacy rights that leads to Flanagan v.
Flanagan, two statements in the Katz opinion are of major importance.
First, Justice Stewart wrote that "the Fourth Amendment cannot be
translated into a general constitutional 'right to privacy."'' 88 Second, Justice
Harlan, in a concurring opinion, read the Court's holding to conclude that
in a telephone booth, as in a home, a person had a constitutionally protected
reasonable expectation of privacy, and that electronic, and not just physical,
intrusion may constitute a violation of the Fourth Amendment. 89 But there
was even more hidden in the Katz opinion of value than its profound
holding. Writing on the philosophical, or even commonsensical,
parameters of privacy, Justice Harlan said:
My understanding of the rule that has emerged from prior
decisions is that there is a twofold requirement, first that a
person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of
privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is
prepared to recognize as "reasonable." Thus a man's home is,
for most purposes, a place where he expects privacy, but objects,
activities, or statements that he exposes to the "plain view" of
outsiders are not "protected" because no intention to keep them
to himself has been exhibited. On the other hand, conversations
in the open would not be protected against being overheard, for
the expectation of privacy under the circumstances would be
unreasonable.
90
For the first time, the law moved within the mind of the person being
recorded to draw dispositive lines. The touchstone was "reasonable
expectations of privacy." After Katz, if a person had the subjective
expectation of privacy and if that expectation were reasonable, government
agencies could not eavesdrop upon him and use the information against
him. The case held more than that subjective analytical litmus. It was also
enlightening that at least one justice in the majority believed that if a person
exposed statements to outsiders-no matter where he was-he exhibited no
87. Id. at 352.
88. Katz, 389 U.S. at 350.
89. Id. at 360-61 (Harlan, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
90. Id. at 361 (emphasis added) (citing to Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924), on
the issue of privacy in an open field).
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expectation of privacy because it was apparent he did not intend to keep
those statements to himself.
Still, analysis in the area suffered from what might be called
"semiotic noise," that is, some disturbances around the clear signal we as
audience members would hope to understand as the meaning of "privacy."
The majority opinion talked of "what a person knowingly exposes to the
public," 91 and Justice Harlan spoke of matter exposed "to the single 'plain
view' of outsiders" as not being protected because no intention to keep
things private has been exhibited.92 Furthermore, it was clear that that
personal expectation of privacy could not be idiosyncratic. The expectation
had to "be one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.'
93
Thus, if you chose to expose something, it could not be private. If you
chose not to expose anything, the government could not reach in and rip it
from your possession, unless, of course, your expectation that it would not
be exposed to the government was simply not in tune with social norms.
The result was that if a person talked to strangers in their own home,
the United States Constitution would not protect him under the Fourth
Amendment, that is, against the government. But what if the
eavesdropping were conducted by private persons and the person
eavesdropped upon then repaired to the common law for his remedy? The
outcome was uncertain. Just a few years later, one answer was
forthcoming.
B. Secret Recording by Private Parties, Including Newsgatherers
1. The Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
Generally, the case of Dietemann v. Time, Inc.,9 4 is considered the
first of its species. It focused on the concept of the "restricted area," in this
instance Dietemann's den.95 He used the den as a home office, practicing,
as the court called it, "simple quackery" by the practice of healing with
clay, minerals and herbs.96 Two reporters went to the home and told
Dietemann that they had been sent there by a friend.97 The woman reporter
91. Id. at 351.
92. See id. at 361(Harlan, J., concurring).
93. Id. at 361.
94. 449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971).
95. Id. at 246.
96. Id.
97. Id.
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told Dietemann that she had a lump in her breast. 98 The other reporter had
a hidden camera which he used to photograph Dietemann without
Dietemann's knowledge. 99 While Dietemann concluded that the cause of
the trouble was that the woman reporter had eaten some rancid butter
eleven years, nine months, and seven days prior to that date, their
conversation was transmitted by a hidden radio transmitter in her purse to a
tape recorder in a parked automobile nearby.'00
The Ninth Circuit, diverging from the intimations and holdings of the
United States Supreme Court in Katz four years earlier, held that choosing
to talk to strangers in your home did not necessarily mean you had waived
your right not to be secretly recorded.'0 ' One must be alert to the
distinctions in analyzing cases based on whether or not the persons doing
the eavesdropping are private individuals acting on their own, on behalf of
the government or on behalf of the public. Here, the persons doing the
eavesdropping were not government agents:
One who invites another to his home or office takes a risk that
the visitor may not be what he seems, and that the visitor may
repeat all he hears and observes when he leaves. But he does
not and should not be required to take the risk that what is heard
and seen will be transmitted by photograph or recording, or in
our modem world, in full living color and hi-fi to the public at
large or to any segment of it that the visitor may select. A
different rule could have a most pernicious effect upon the
dignity of man and it would surely lead to guarded conversations
and conduct where candor is most valued, e.g., in the case of
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Dietemann, 449 F.2d at 249. The court in Dietemann cited Briscoe v. Reader's Digest
Ass 'n, 483 P.2d 34 (Cal. 1971), a California Supreme Court case decided shortly before its own
decision. Dietemann, 449 F.2d at 248. The court in Briscoe had passionately held forth on a
growing acceptance of the right of privacy which, the court remarked, paralleled the increasing
capability of electronic devices. Briscoe, 483 P.2d at 37. The devices, the California court had
said, had the '""capacity to destroy an individual's anonymity, intrude upon his most intimate
activities, and expose his most personal characteristics to public gaze.."" Id.
The claim is not so much one of total secrecy as it is of the right to define one's
circle of intimacy- to choose who shall seek beneath the quotidian mask. Loss of
control over which 'face' one puts on may result in literal loss of self-identity, and
is humiliating beneath the gaze of those whose curiosity treats a human being as an
object.
Id. (citations omitted). "Quotidian" is defined as (1) occurring every day; or (2) belonging to
each day, every day, common place, ordinary. MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S TENTH NEW COLLEGIATE
DICTIONARY 961 (1999).
101. Dietemann, 449 F.2d at 249.
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doctors and lawyers. 
102
Dietemann was a journeyman plumber who claimed to be a
scientist. 10 3 Whether his home was a private place depended on many
factors, according to the court's reasoning: he had no listings; his home
bore no sign of any kind; he did not advertise; and he did not charge for his
diagnosis or prescriptions, accepting only contributions. 10 4 These and other
facts implied that Dietemann reasonably expected privacy, and, as a result,
the Court found that Dietemann was entitled to damages for the emotional
distress caused by the intrusion and the publication by Life Magazine.'
0 5
The Dietemann case inserted a completely new consideration into the
analytical flow chart used to determine whether or not something overheard
was private. Three "properties" of the situation can be identified: (1) the
office was within a home, (2) the recording was made by a private person,
and (3) the recording was published to a large audience.'0 6 The question is,
Were each of the three properties an indispensable element of the
compound called liability, or were two of them, or perhaps one alone,
enough to reach the conclusion that the broadcasters were liable to
Dietemann for the emotional distress caused by the broadcast? In the thirty
years since Dietemann, no clear answer has been forthcoming.
A few years before, in 1967, the California Legislature passed the
Invasion of Privacy Act'0 7 (Privacy Act), establishing criminal and civil
penalties for various forms of wiretapping and eavesdropping and vesting
in the person whose words were overheard or intercepted a civil cause of
action for damages. Once the Privacy Act went into effect in California,
three separate types of limitation upon audio recording of conversations
existed: constitutional, common law, and statutory. At the time, it was
impossible to predict precisely what new amalgam of circumstances would
lead to liability in instances where audio recording occurred.
California Penal Code section 631 focuses entirely upon telegraph or
telephone wire, line, cable, or instruments. 1 8  In addition, section 632
102. Id.
103. Id. at 246.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 249.
106. Id. at 247.
107. CAL. PENAL CODE, §§ 630-637.5 (West 1999).
108. Section 63 1(a) imposes liability as follows:
Any person who, by means of any machine, instrument, or contrivance, or in any
other manner, intentionally taps, or makes any unauthorized connection, whether
physically, electrically, acoustically, inductively, or otherwise, with any telegraph
or telephone wire, line, cable, or instrument, including the wire, line, cable, or
instrument of any internal telephonic communication system, or who willfully and
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expands the scope of restrictions on audio recording.'0 9 Section 632 is not
however, restricted to the telephone or telegraph. But it is restricted to
"confidential communications" and to eavesdropping or recording using
electronic amplifying or recording devices. This section applies whether
the communication is carried on among the parties in the presence of one
another or by means of telegraph, telephone or other device (with the
exception of radio). " 0
2. The Right of Dissemination
In Ribas v. Clark,"' the Court referred to section 632 in dicta while
discussing section 631 upon which the holding was based. 1 2 There, Clark
used an extension to listen to a telephone conversation between a recently
divorced couple at the ex-wife's request. 113  The husband sued. Clark
claimed that section 631 only applied to wiretaps. 14  The California
Supreme Court disagreed and published an opinion that sounded a note
later heard multiple times in the eavesdropping context:
While one who imparts private information risks the betrayal of
his confidence by the other party, a substantial distinction has
been recognized between the secondhand repetition of the
content of the conversation and its simultaneous dissemination
to an unannounced second auditor, whether that auditor be a
person or a mechanical device.115
without the consent of all parties to the communication, or in any unauthorized
manner, reads, or attempts to read, or to learn the contents or meaning of any
message, report, or communication while the same is in transit or passing over any
wire, line, or cable, or is being sent from, or received at any place within this
state...
109. Section 632(a) states:
Every person who, intentionally and without the consent of all parties to a
confidential communication, by means of any electronic amplifying or recording
device, eavesdrops upon or records the confidential communication, whether the
communication is carried on among the parties in the presence of one another or by
means of a telegraph, telephone, or other device, except a radio...
110. In 1985 the Cellular Radio Telephone Privacy Act of 1985 was enacted by the
California Legislature "to provide a legal recourse to those persons whose private cellular radio
telephone communications were maliciously invaded by persons not intended to receive such
communication." 1985 Cal. Stat. 909 § 2 (emphasis added). The word "maliciously" was added
to avoid liability for persons who, all too frequently, may be on their own cellular telephone or
other device and suddenly find themselves auditing a private conversation between complete
strangers. It did little to change the terrain of analysis. See id.
111. 696 P.2d 637 (Cal. 1985).
112. Id. at 641.
113. Id. at 637.
114. Id. at 640.
115. Id.
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Ribas obviously presented a new mode of thinking about privacy. It
was not related to physical space and did not matter that the conversation
was something that the ex-wife would have been able to relate to defendant
Clark immediately after hanging up the telephone. In other words, it did
not matter at all to the court that the content of the conversation could not
be conceived of as "private" by any person on the street, because Ribas
knew that the antagonistic wife was likely to describe the conversation to
anyone she chose. The concept of a reasonable expectation of privacy in
what was being said was missing from Ribas. What was new in this non-
media case was the idea that a person had the right to control the extent of
the first-hand dissemination of his statements. Ribas held that section 631
gave a speaker the right to control who was listening to him on the
telephone even if there was no reasonable expectation of privacy in the
content of the conversation.
3. The Highly Offensive Standard
The conflict in California regarding privacy in eavesdropping
situations was faced again in Shulman v. Group WProductions, Inc.116 The
case did not involve Penal Code section 632, but did involve behavior that
might have triggered it. Because the case proceeded to the Supreme Court
on a summary judgment ruling by the trial court, many issues were left
undecided. But some things were made clear about the common law tort of
intrusion and the parameters of "privacy" and "confidentiality." In that
case, a television cameraman, working for a production company on a
series of programs about emergency workers, had equipped the flight nurse
on a rescue helicopter with a microphone. 1 7 The crew flew to the scene of
an accident with an overturned vehicle and a woman pinned inside it." 8
The cameraman recorded the accident victim's statements to the flight
nurse crawling under the vehicle during the rescue operation. 
119
The Court held summary judgment was inappropriate on whether the
woman expected her conversations with her rescuers to remain private, and
whether the expectations claimed were reasonable.120 Too many facts were
in dispute. Plaintiffs had sued for intrusion, but had not brought a claim
under Penal Code section 632. Nevertheless, the Court engaged in
116. 955 P.2d 469 (Cal. 1998). Shulman is not strictly a "hidden" recording case. The
microphone was visible on the flight nurse's suit, but plaintiffs alleged they could not see it. See
id. at 475-76.
117. Id. at 475.
118. Id. at 474.
119. Id. at 474-75.
120. Id. at 491.
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considerable discussion regarding that section, on the theory that it might
provide a basis for understanding the reasonable expectation of privacy of
the plaintiff. In its discussions, the Court explicitly declined to resolve the
conflict between cases relating to what expectation of "confidentiality"
triggered section 632.2 Under any interpretation of section 632, the court
felt that triable issues existed where the plaintiffs had a "reasonable
expectation of privacy in their communications to medical personnel.
122 ,
Even though the case was not about Penal Code section 632, it shed much
light upon the California Supreme Court's thinking with respect to
confidentiality, privacy, and what reasonable expectations of each were.
The Shulman Court introduced in its holding yet another new factor
into California eavesdropping analysis. 23 The physical situation in the
Shulman case was an accident site attended by many rescue personnel.
124
The conversations took place while the plaintiff was trapped inside the car
by the side of the road, which is not a place commonly recognized as an
area of protected privacy. 125 The court found that there was no
constitutional principle that ""gives a reporter general license to intrude in
an objectively offensive manner into private places, conversations, or
matters.""' 126 However, even if plaintiffs proved they had a reasonable
expectation of privacy, the journalists had a complete defense if they
showed that the behavior had not been "highly offensive.'' 27  That
determination depended upon "the extent to which the intrusion was, under
the circumstances, justified by the legitimate motive of gathering the
news." 2 8 In fact, conduct that might be highly offensive in some contexts
"may not be offensive to a reasonable person when employed by journalists
in pursuit of a socially or politically important story.'
' 29
4. Circumstantial Effects on the Right of Privacy
The last major California case prior to Flanagan v. Flanagan that
spreads the framing of eavesdropping privacy analysis wider still is
121. Id. at 492 n.15.
122. Shulman, 955 P.2d at 492 n.15.
123. Id. at 497.
124. Id. at 491 n.13.
125. Id. at 490.
126. Id. at 497.
127. See id. at 490.
128. Shulman, 955 P.2d at 493.
129. Id. Ultimate resolution of the issues discussed here was never decided. The parties
settled the matter before trial.
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Sanders v. ABC, Inc.130  There, an ABC reporter got a job as a
"telepsychic" with a company that also employed the plaintiff, Mark
Sanders, in the same capacity.13 1 While the reporter worked, she .... wore a
small video camera in her hat [and] covertly videotaped her conversations
with several co-workers, including Sanders." 132 The California Supreme
Court granted review to determine whether the fact that employees knew
that interactions they had were open and likely to be witnessed by other
employees (in addition to the reporter) necessarily defeated any reasonable
expectation of privacy against covert videotaping.' 33 The Court concluded
that, although Sanders knew he was talking to co-workers in a non-public
area, he still had an expectation that he was not being tape recorded:
In an office or other work place to which the general public does
not have unfettered access, employees may enjoy a limited, but
legitimate, expectation that their conversations and other
interactions will not be secretly videotaped by undercover
television reporters, even though those conversations may not
have been completely private from the participants' co-
workers. 134
The jury in that case had found that there was no violation of Penal
Code section 632.135 Thus, the holding did not directly affect the
jurisprudence relating to that section.
The Sanders opinion left open many questions regarding audiotaped
eavesdropping under the common law tort of intrusion:
We hold only that, where the other elements of the intrusion tort
are proven, the cause of action is not defeated as a matter of law
simply because the events or conversations upon which the
defendant allegedly intruded were not completely private from
all other eyes and ears. 136
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court made it clear that businesses could
be surreptitiously recorded by journalists, stating:
[W]e do not hold or imply that investigative journalists
necessarily commit a tort by secretly recording events and
conversations in offices, stores or other work places. Whether a
130. 978 P.2d 67 (Cal. 1999).




135. Sanders, 978 P.2d at 70.
136. Id. at 69.
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reasonable expectation of privacy is violated by such recording
depends on the exact nature of the conduct and all the
surrounding circumstances. In addition, liability under the
intrusion tort requires that the invasion be highly offensive to a
reasonable person, considering, among other factors the motive
of the alleged intruder.1
37
The California Supreme Court had chosen a rather measured
approach to the issue of privacy, at least with respect to the intrusion tort in
cases involving surreptitious recording by the media. The Court stated that
a reasonable expectation of privacy depended upon the exact nature of the
conduct and all of the surrounding circumstances; that it had to be highly
offensive to a reasonable person; and that the motive of the alleged intruder
had to be taken into account. 138 The holdings radiated the classic methods
and frame of mind employed in case-by-case analyses, taking into account
multiple unique factors, and thereby shaping privacy law in California.
These holdings set the stage for the California Supreme Court's decision in
Flanagan v. Flanagan.
IV. FLANAGAN V. FLANAGAN
A. The California Supreme Court's Decision
Flanagan v. Flanagan139 came to the California Supreme Court laden
with the history of the developments discussed above. 140  The
developments had been carefully charted and were intellectually
provocative at every leg of the trip. Flanagan was, by comparison, a soap
opera. A husband was rich and had been diagnosed with prostate cancer.
His son and others were part of his estate planning. His doctors prescribed
medication to slow the spread of the cancer. His wife allegedly told her
manicurist that she was injecting her husband with water instead of the
medicine. The manicurist testified that she thereafter began taping
telephone conversations with the wife and ultimately played one of the tape
recordings for the husband's son. The son then played the tape for the
husband. The husband moved out and doctors allegedly determined that he
had not been receiving the prescribed medication during the months before
137. Id. at 69 (citing Shulman, 955 P.2d at 490).
138. See id. at 77 (weighing all surrounding circumstances in deciding whether there was a
reasonable expectation of privacy).
139. 41 P.3d 575 (Cal. 2002).
140. Id. at 579.
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his arrival at the clinic. The opinion reflects that the husband changed his
will and filed for divorce. Then the husband and wife reconciled and the
husband moved back in. The wife began taping all of the telephone
conversations between the son and the husband after that time, leading to
the petition to the California Supreme Court.
1 4'
Faced with these facts, the court focused only on the circumstances of
the telephone calls, and purposely ignored their contents, determining that
because the son "did not know his calls were being recorded," he was
entitled to relief on all of the recorded calls that the jury determined were
"confidential. 142 In an effort billed as an attempt to establish a "coherent
statutory scheme," protecting "confidential" communications, the court
held that the law must protect "against intentional, nonconsensual
recording of telephone conversations regardless of the content of the
conversation or the type of telephone involved., 143 Thus, at least within the
context of intentionally recorded telephone calls between a father and his
son, Flanagan held that a conversation is confidential if a party to that
conversation has "an objectively reasonable expectation that the
conversation is not being overheard or recorded.,
144
Flanagan resolved a troublesome split in California's Courts of
Appeal over the meaning of the phrase "confidential communication" in
California Penal Code section 632. Put simply, section 632 punishes a
person who records "confidential communications" without the consent of
all parties to the communication.1 45 Section 632(c) defines the phrase
"confidential communication" as follows:
The term "confidential communication" includes any
communication carried on in circumstances as may reasonably
indicate that any party to the communication desires it to be
confined to the parties thereto, but excludes a communication
made in a public gathering or in any legislative, judicial,
executive or administrative proceedings open to the public, or in
any other circumstances in which the parties to the
communication may reasonably expect that the communication
may be overheard or recorded. 
4 6
The split in California's appellate courts developed because there are
different views about what "confidential communications" means. One
141. See id. at 577-79 (factual and procedural background of the case).
142. Id. at 578.
143. Id. at 581-82.
144. Id.
145. Flanagan, 41 P.3d. at 580.
146. CAL. PENAL CODE § 632(c) (West 1999).
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line of cases took a narrow, and more media-friendly, view of the phrase
while the other line expanded the meaning of "confidential." In Flanagan,
the California Supreme Court ultimately endorsed the more expanded
view. 147
The schism in the intermediate appellate courts began with Frio v.
Superior Court.148  Richard Frio recorded telephone conversations on
business matters with individuals that later would be his litigation
adversaries. 49 Frio took notes from these recordings, recorded over the
tapes, and read his notes in preparation for his deposition. 150 Later, Frio
offered his notes into evidence, but the trial court refused, citing Penal
Code section 632(d), which, "[e]xcept as proof in an action or prosecution
for violation of' section 632, precludes the admission of "evidence
obtained as a result of eavesdropping upon or recording a confidential
communication in violation of' Section 632.15 Frio argued that there was
no violation of section 632 in recording the conversations because the
communications related to business matters and pending litigation, and
therefore could not be considered "confidential.1 52  The Court rejected
Frio's arguments, finding that "the recorded parties reasonably expected
their communications would not be simultaneously disseminated to an
unannounced second auditor," and concluding that "under section 632
'confidentiality' appears to require nothing more than the existence of a
reasonable expectation by one of the parties that no one is 'listening in' or
overhearing the conversation."' 53 Thus, an expectation of "confidentiality"
was defined as an expectation that no one unknown to the speaker was
listening and no one was recording.
O'Laskey v. Sortino was the next decision to tackle the term
"confidential communication," and it departed from Frio's analysis. 154
Phillip O'Laskey, suing on a personal injury claim, sought to oppose
defendants' summary judgment motion brought on statute of limitations
grounds. 155  O'Laskey needed to demonstrate that defendant Michael
Sortino had been out of the state for more than eight days in the previous
year, thus tolling the statute. If successful in so showing, O'Laskey's
147. Flanagan, 41 P.3d at 577.
148. 250 Cal. Rptr. 819 (Ct. App. 1988).
149. Id. at 821.
150. Id. at 820.
151. Id. at 824.
152. Id. at 823.
153. Id. at 823, 824.
154. O'Laskey v. Sortino, 273 Cal. Rptr. 674 (Ct. App. 1990).
155. Id. at 676.
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complaint would be deemed timely filed.156 In order to make his argument,
O'Laskey hired a private investigator who, "using a ruse," called Sortino
and told Sortino that he was the producer of a television show and that
Sortino was eligible to win $100,000 if he had traveled in the past year and
was willing to answer questions about his trip.' 57 Sortino eagerly obliged
and told the investigator, who was secretly recording Sortino, that he had
been to Las Vegas for two weeks in the previous year.' 58 The secretly
recorded conversation clearly contradicted Sortino's sworn deposition
testimony. 159
The trial court in O 'Laskey refused to admit a transcript of the tape on
the ground that the tape was recorded in violation of section 632 and
therefore was inadmissible under subsection (d).' 60 The California Court of
Appeal disagreed with the trial court's section 632 analysis, determining
that admissibility of the tape revolved around whether the tape was
"confidential."' 6' The court surveyed law enforcement cases and gave
several examples of taped conversations that were not confidential. 62 The
court also discussed cases, including Frio, in which the person being
recorded had a reasonable expectation of privacy. 63 Ultimately, the Court
determined that "the statute means what it says," and the question is
whether Sortino "reasonably expected, under the circumstances
surrounding the investigator's call, that the conversation would not be
divulged to any one else."' 64 The O'Laskey Court's conclusion was that
the call was not "confidential" because Sortino had to expect that the
content of the call would be revealed to other persons.
6
1
Later, another California Court of Appeal returned to Frio's reasoning
156. Id.
157. Id. at 675.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 675-76.
160. O'Laskey, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 676..
161. Id. at 677.
162. Id.; e.g., People v. Blair, 82 Cal. Rptr. 673, 676-77 (Ct. App. 1969).(suspect's recorded
jailhouse confession to his brother had no reasonable expectation of privacy, notwithstanding
suspect's belief that they were in an "attorney's room" where conversations would not be
recorded); People v. Newton, 116 Cal. Rptr. 690, 693 (Ct. App. 1974) (suspect in back of police
car had no reasonable expectation of privacy in comments to fellow suspect).
163. Id.; e.g., People v. Wyrick, 144 Cal. Rptr. 38, 42 (Ct. App. 1978) (reasonable
expectation of privacy between an attorney and a doctor who had previously refused to assist the
attorney in a personal injury case); Warden v. Kahn, 160 Cal. Rptr. 471, 477 (Ct. App. 1979)
(conversation between blind client and attorney where client thought reasonable attorney would
believe conversations were being recorded).
164. O'Laskey, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 678.
165. Id.
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in Coulter v. Bank of America.166 Christopher Coulter, a bank employee,
secretly recorded several conversations with co-workers and superiors in
anticipation of employment litigation he would later file. 167 "Each of the
employees submitted affidavits stating the conversations were in private,
they intended them to be confidential, and they did not consent to their
being recorded." 168 Coulter contended that the recorded conversations
were not "confidential" under Section 632 because "it was expected that
the subject matter of the conversations would be repeated to other bank
employees[.] ' 169 The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the
bank employees, and the appellate court affirmed, finding, "that the subject
matter might be later discussed has no bearing on whether section 632 has
been violated.,
170
In 1997, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
weighed in on the split when applying California law in Deteresa v. ABC,
Inc. 171 Beverly Deteresa was an attendant on the flight from Los Angeles
to Chicago that O.J. Simpson took shortly after the murders of his ex-wife
and Ronald Goldman. One week after the flight, an ABC producer came to
the door of Deteresa's condominium, told her that he worked for ABC, and
that he wanted to speak with her about appearing on a television show that
would discuss the flight. At first, Deteresa told the producer that she was
not interested in appearing on the show; however, she proceeded to reveal
several details that she remembered about the flight. She then told him that
she would "think about" appearing on his show.
The next day, the producer called Deteresa and, when she declined to
appear on his show, told her that he had audiotaped their entire
conversation the previous day. He told her also that he had directed a
camera person to videotape them from a public street adjacent to Deteresa's
home. ABC broadcast a five-second clip of the videotape and repeated one
of the things that Deteresa had told the producer about Simpson wrapping
his hand in a bag of ice. ABC did not broadcast any portion of the
audiotape. 172
The court was called upon to interpret Penal Code section 632. ABC
admitted that the recording had been made intentionally and without the
consent of one party to the communication. What was left to decide before
166. 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 766 (Ct. App. 1994).
167. Id. at 768.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 770.
170. Id. at 771.
171. 121 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1997).
172. Id. at 462-63.
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liability could be imposed was whether the communication was
"confidential" as required by the statute.' 73
The Ninth Circuit observed that California state appellate courts had,
up to that time, stated two competing formulations of what a party must
reasonably expect for a communication to be confidential. 174 Because the
California Supreme Court "ha[d] not visited these conflicting lines of
cases," the Ninth Circuit was required to use its best judgment to predict
how the California Supreme Court would decide the question.' 75 The Court
ruled against Deteresa, finding that she did not reasonably expect the
conversation to be confined to the parties. Elaborating on Deteresa's
reasonable expectations, the Court stated in pertinent part that:
Radziwill immediately revealed that he worked for ABC and
wanted Deteresa to appear on television to discuss the flight;
Deteresa did not tell Radziwill that her statements were in
confidence; Deteresa did not tell Radziwill that the conversation
was just between them; and Deteresa did not request that
Radziwill not share the information with anyone else. Radziwill,
for his part, did not promise to keep what Deteresa told him in
confidence. We agree, from these undisputed facts, that no one
in Deteresa's shoes could reasonably expect that a reporter
would not divulge her account of where Simpson had sat on the
flight and where he had or had not kept his hand.
176
Frio and O'Laskey agree that any expectations must be objectively
reasonable, but beyond that the opinions diverged on the meaning behind
section 632's language. The Frio decision, later reinforced by Coulter,
determined that "confidential communications" were those
communications that one would not reasonably expect to be overheard or
recorded.177 The O'Laskey opinion (supported by Deteresa), on the other
hand, held that a communication only was confidential if neither party to
the communication reasonably expected "that the content of the call would
be revealed to other persons.''
178
The Ninth Circuit cogently articulated the split with a "simple
example":
A simple example demonstrates how differently FriolCoulter
and O'Laskey each construe section 632(a). Suppose X and Y
173. Id. at 463. ; CAL. PENAL CODE § 632(a) (West 1999).
174. Deteresa, 121 F.3d at 463-64.
175. Id. at 465.
176. Id.
177. Frio, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 824.
178. OLaskey, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 677.
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are hiking in the woods. Y offers to pay X the $5.00 that Y
owes X. X tells Y to pay the money to Z, because X owes Z
$5.00. When X finds out that Y had taped the conversation, he
sues Y. Under Frio, X wins because in the wilderness he had a
reasonable expectation that no one overheard their conversation.
Under O'Laskey, Y wins, because X had a reasonable
expectation that Y would divulge the conversation to Z. 179
The Ninth Circuit's example is illustrative, but is perhaps too
"simple" by portraying the schism between Frio/Coulter and O 'Laskey as
if it were merely a puddle that could be crossed in one leap. Other
examples, however, reveal that the split in the holdings runs much deeper
and wider. For instance, consider the following conversations between X
and Y as they are hiking in the woods:
" X to Y: "I'm very shy. Would you please call Z and ask
her if she would like to have coffee with me tomorrow
afternoon?"
* X to Y: "I have a few ideas for your big speech to the
Rotary Club next week."
* X to Y: "Please tell Z that the milk in the refrigerator is
bad and that she should not drink it."
* X to Y, shortly after discovering a fire in the woods:
"I'm getting very tired. You run ahead and tell the park
ranger that the fire is 2 miles northeast of the bend in
Pike's Road."
Now suppose that, in each of the foregoing cases, Y secretly taped the
remarks, and when X found out, he sued Y under section 632. According
to Frio/Coulter, and Flanagan, X theoretically would be liable in each case
(and could be criminally prosecuted), but under O'Laskey and Deteresa, X
would not be liable. That is the ocean of difference between the
Frio/Coulter/Flanagan line and the O 'Laskey/Deteresa line.
B. Legislative History Surrounding the Debate
The Legislature repealed Penal Code section 653j in 1967, and
replaced it with Section 632.180 Its purpose was to change California from
a "one-party-consent" state to a "two-party-consent" state. 181 Thus, instead
179. Deteresa, 121 F.2d at 464 n.l.
180. See A.B. 860, 1967 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1967) [hereinafter A.B. 860]; see also Frio,
250 Cal. Rptr. at 822.
181. See A.B. 860, at 2; see CAL. PENAL CODE § 632(a).
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of permitting one party to a confidential communication to record
surreptitiously, the new law prohibited recordings without the consent of all
parties to a conversation. In enacting section 632, however, the Legislature
chose not to change the limiting language and definition of "confidential
communication," but instead adopted verbatim the language and definition
from the predecessor statute, section 653j(c). 
82
Section 653j permitted one party to a confidential communication to
record her conversation without liability.1 83  Thus, an individual never
could reasonably expect that his communication with others was not being
recorded because any other party to the conversation was free to record it
without permission at any time. For the qualification "confidential
communication" to have any meaning under former section 653j, it had to
mean more than a communication that one simply did not expect would be
recorded. In other words, a "confidential communication" must mean
more than an expectation that one is being recorded since, under former
section 653j's one-party consent system, such an expectation would always
have been unreasonable. An interpretation to the contrary would have
rendered the language of section 653j self-contradictory and in violation of
basic principles of statutory construction.' 84  Since section 632 uses the
same definition of "confidential communication" as was used in section
653j, section 632's definition also should not be limited only to situations
where there was a reasonable expectation that a communication would not
be recorded.
Flanagan holds that liability does not attach if the person being
recorded should have a reasonable expectation that he or she is being
recorded or overheard. 185  After justifying this broad interpretation of
''confidential" based on what the Court calls the "plain language" of section
632 and the court's previous holdings protecting privacy interests, the
Flanagan decision offers some legislative history to support its opinion.
186
Oddly, however, the Court does not rely on the legislative history for
section 632. Instead, the Court turns to the legislative history of statutes
182. The legislative history materials make clear that the Legislature did not intend to
disturb the meaning of "confidential communication" found in former Section 653j. See A.B.
860 (explaining that section 632(c) "is adapted without change from the existing section
653j(c)").
183. CAL. PENAL CODE § 653j(a), repealed by CAL. PENAL CODE § 632 (1967).
184. See, e.g., Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Macri, 842 P.2d 112, 116 (Cal. 1992) (stating that
statute must be interpreted in manner that avoids internal inconsistency); Moyer v. Workmen's
Comp. Appeals Bd., 514 P.2d 1224, 1229 (Cal. 1973) ("[V]arious parts of a statutory enactment
must be harmonized by considering the particular clause or section in the context of the statutory
framework as a whole.").
185. Flanagan, 41 P.3d at 580.
186. Id. at 580-81.
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enacted many years after the passage of Section 632.187
In the years since its enactment in 1967, the Invasion of Privacy Act
has been amended to prohibit the interception and recording of cellular
radio, cordless telephone and cellular telephone conversations., 88  These
statutes prohibit the interception and recording of any-communication over
those modalities; they do not require that the communication be
"confidential" before liability can be imposed. Instead, one participating in
a cellular or wireless communication need only demonstrate that he or she
did not consent to its recording or interception. Although these statutes
clearly contemplate a different-and stricter-standard barring recordings,
Flanagan reasons that "it would be anomalous to interpret the Privacy Act
as protecting all cellular or cordless phone conversations, but only those
landline conversations that the parties intended to keep secret[.]"' 189 The
court supposedly constructs a "coherent statutory scheme" that "protects
against intentional, nonconsensual recording of telephone conversations
regardless of the content of the conversation or the type of telephone
involved."' 90  In other words, the court seems to acknowledge the
difference in language between section 632 and its sister statutes, but-
disregarding the "confidential communication" limitation in section 632
and failing to cite any legislative history for section 632-determines that
section 632 should be interpreted in the same manner as sections 632.5,
632.6, and 632.7.
Flanagan's citation to the legislative history of other laws appears
contradictory. If the Legislature meant for a "confidential communication"
under section 632 to include any communication that the parties did not
believe was being recorded, that law would apply generally to all
communications that were recorded or intercepted using any modality.
Under this rationale, there was no reason for the Legislature to enact later
statutes such as Sections 632.5, 632.6, and 632.7.' 91 Knowing full well the
language of section 632, the Legislature decided not to include the
"confidential communication" requirement in cases of cellular and wireless
communications. This allows the inference that the critical language in
section 632 must mean that the Legislature intended "confidential" to mean
more than a bare threshold requirement that the participants simply not
187. Id. at 581-82.
188. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 632.5-632.7.
189. Flanagan, 41 P.3d at 581.
190. Id. at 581-82.
191. See Lambert v. Conrad, 8 Cal. Rptr. 56, 62 (Ct. App. 1960) (stating "'[w]here a statute,
with reference to one subject contains a given provision, the omission of such provision from a
similar statute concerning a related subject is significant to show that a different intention
existed"' [citations omitted]).
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expect to be recorded.
The legislative history that is actually helpful in interpreting the
phrase "confidential communication" is surprisingly sparse, but one
document indicates that Flanagan's interpretation was wrong. On July 31,
1967, Jesse M. Unruh, the Speaker of the California Assembly and the
author of Assembly Bill 860 (which later became section 632), wrote a
letter to Governor Ronald Reagan urging him to sign Assembly Bill 860.192
Unruh's letter explained: "This bill insures that anything said in a
confidential conversation which any one of the parties desires be kept
between the parties must be kept private."' 193 Unruh's description of his
proposed legislation comports with O'Laskey's notion that a conversation
is protected only if there is a reasonable expectation that the content will
not later be divulged to third parties. 94  The letter shows that the
Legislature wanted to protect only those communications where those
talking could reasonably say they were "entre nous."
V. DECONSTRUCTION OF THE STATUTE'S LANGUAGE SHOWS FLANAGAN
WAS INCORRECTLY DECIDED
For newsgatherers following Flanagan, section 632 comes down to
three words: "confidential," "overhear," and "party.,
195
A. The Meaning of "Confidential"
Although a fair number of opinions, including the ones discussed
above, address section 632, relatively few of those opinions parse the
language of the statute itself. The two opinions that make the greatest
effort to analyze the language in section 632, Deteresa v. ABC, Inc., 196 and
Flanagan v. Flanagan,197 came to opposite conclusions on the term
"confidential communications." Flanagan was meant to resolve the
ambiguity in the term "confidential communication," and, although it
supposedly resolved a split in the California Courts of Appeal, it left doubt
that the word "confidential" means anything at all post-Flanagan, or that
192. See Letter from Jesse M. Unruh, Speaker, California Assembly, to Ronald Reagan,
Governor, State of California, (July 31, 1967) (original on file with the California State
Archives).
193. Id. (emphasis added).
194. O'Laskey, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 678.
195. Other terms have been given interesting, and somewhat dubious, interpretations
through the years. For example, one court held that sexual acts can constitute "communication"
under section 632. People v. Gibbons, 263 Cal. Rptr. 905, 908 (Ct. App. 1989).
196. 121 F.3d 460 (9th Cir. 1997).
197. 41 P.3d 575 (Cal. 2002).
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its interpretation should apply in the media context.
In Deteresa, the Ninth Circuit emphasized the plain meaning of the
statute, noting that "'courts will not interpret away clear language in favor
of an ambiguity that does not exist."' 198 To the Ninth Circuit there was
little room for debate-the clear language of the statute meant that
"if... neither party reasonably expects the communication to be confined
to the parties, it is not confidential."'' 99 Interestingly, this is almost a direct
quote from Frio, which held that "[a] communication must be protected if
either party reasonably expects the communication to be confined to the
parties.,,200 Frio, however, went a step further, "impl[ying] ... that unless
someone reasonably expects that the communication will be overheard, the
communication is confidential., 20' The Ninth Circuit's opinion is logically
persuasive when it says "that [Frio's] interpretation renders the first clause
of section 632 surplusage. 20 2  In discussing the first clause of section
632(c), the court stated:
The problem with Frio is that it transforms a specific exclusion
to the definition of "confidential communication" into the
definition itself. The first clause of section 632(c) explains that
"confidential communication" includes any communication
carried on in circumstances as may reasonably indicate that any
party to the communication desires it to be confined
thereto.. 23
Continuing, the court concluded:
The second clause of section 632(c) goes on specifically to
exclude communications "made in a public gathering.., or in
any other circumstances in which the parties to the
communication may reasonably expect that the communication
may be overheard or recorded." Frio, in effect, reads the first
clause of section 632 out of the statute.2°
In other words, the Ninth Circuit rejected Frio's suggestion that the
Legislature said anything that is "confidential" may not be recorded.
"Confidential" includes certain things and excludes that which one
reasonably believes is being overheard or recorded, but is anything that
198. Deteresa, 121 F.2d at 464 (quoting People v. Coronado, 906 P.2d 1232, 1234 (Cal.
1995) (citations omitted)).
199. Id.
200. Frio v. Coulter, 250 Cal. Rptr. 819, 823 (Ct. App. 1988).
201. Deteresa, 121 F.2d at 464.
202. Id.
203. Id. (citation omitted).
204. Id. at 464-65.
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someone does not reasonably believe is being recorded or overheard. The
Ninth Circuit presumed that the Legislature did not engage in such
redundant and superfluous drafting, concluding that "if someone does not
reasonably expect the conversation to be confined to the parties, it makes
no difference under the statute whether the person reasonably expects that
another is listening in or not. The communication is not confidential. 2 °5
In Flanagan, the California Supreme Court, after evaluating the
"inclusions" and "exclusion" language in section 632(c), came to the
opposite conclusion. 20 6 Like the Ninth Circuit, the Supreme Court noted
that section 632(c)'s definition of "confidential communication" has two
clauses.20 7 Unlike the Ninth Circuit's attack on Frio, however, the Court in
Flanagan focused its energy on discounting the reasoning in O'Laskey,
stating that "O'Laskey's conclusion that a conversation is confidential only
if a party has an objectively reasonable expectation that its content will not
be disseminated to others does not conform with the import of the first
clause [in Section 632(c)]. 2 °8
According to the California Supreme Court, O'Laskey was
transforming the inclusionary language in section 632 into the definition
itself.20 9 Flanagan sailed a tack precisely opposite of the Ninth Circuit
(which found that Frio had transformed an exclusion into the rule).
Flanagan reasons that the term "includes" enlarges the definition of
"confidential communication., 210 Thus, according to the court:
[T]he O'Laskey standard, under which the phrase "confidential
communication" not only includes but is limited to
conversations whose content is to be kept secret does not
conform to the inclusive language in section 632, subdivision
(c). This incompatibility disappears, however, if the phrase
"confined to the parties" in the first clause of subdivision (c) is
interpreted to refer to the actual conversation, not its content.
21'
And beginning with that remark, the Court proceeded to render the
word "confidential" dependent only on the physical circumstances of the
conversation, and entirely independent of the content of the conversation.
If the phrase "confined to the parties" refers to the "actual conversation, not
its content," then, according to the court, that phrase "includes within the
205. Id.
206. See Flanagan, 41 P.3d at 581-82.
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statutory protection any conversation under circumstances showing that a
party desires it not to be overheard or recorded[,]" and the second clause of
section 632(c) then "excludes a conversation under circumstances where
the party reasonably believes it will be overheard or recorded., 212 To the
Flanagan Court, this analysis resolved an ambiguity in the statute about the
definition of "confidential communication:"
Under this construction, the two clauses of section 632 do not
conflict nor leave any uncertainty: they act together in harmony
to prohibit unconsented-to-eavesdropping or recording of
conversations of whether the party expects that the content of the
conversation may later be conveyed to a third party.
21 3
In other words, in a non-media context, Flanagan suggests that secretly
recording even the most mundane or inane conversation can lead to
criminal and civil liability.
21 4
Neither the Ninth Circuit nor the California Supreme Court made any
real effort to assess the true "plain meaning" of the terms "confidential" or
"confidential communication," which, under almost any formulation,
relates to something secret or privileged.2 15 Although neither Court paid
much attention to the common notion of the word "confidential," only
Flanagan renders that adjective virtually meaningless. And only the Ninth
Circuit's interpretation is consistent with a common definition of
confidential. By completely divorcing content from a section 632 analysis,
Flanagan invites anomalous results in the law-protecting the recording of
completely meaningless conversations that no one would consider
"confidential." Of course, Flanagan was not a matter where investigative
212. Flanagan, 41 P.3d at 580.
213. Id. at 580-81.
214. Of the twenty-seven calls recorded in Flanagan, only three of the calls were introduced
into evidence in the trial court. Id. at 578. Despite the sparse hard evidence of the content of the
calls, the jury determined that twenty-four of the twenty-seven calls were "confidential." Id. The
California Court of Appeal, employing the O Laskey standard, reasoned that there was no
evidence twenty-five of the twenty-seven calls were "confidential." Id. at 578-79. The Supreme
Court, rejecting the O 'Laskey standard, remanded the case to the Court of Appeal and effectively
commanded that court to ignore the content of the calls. Id. at 582.
215. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 297 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "confidential" as
"[intrusted with the confidence of another or with his secret affairs or purposes; intended to be
held in confidence or kept secret; done in confidence." Further, "confidential communications"
are defined as follows:
privileged communications such as those between spouses, physician-patient, attorney-
client, confessor-penitent, etc .... Confidential communication is statement made
under circumstances showing that speaker intended statement only for ears of person
addressed; thus if communication made in presence of third party whose presence is
not reasonably necessary for the communication, it is not privileged.
Id. at 298.).
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reporters revealed information of crucial public concern and implication
competing constitutional principles in the process.
B. The Meaning of "Overhear"
Under Flanagan, there clearly is no liability for secret recordings if
the person being recorded reasonably should have known that he or she
would be recorded or overheard. Thus, the "or overheard" language
provides a window of relief to secret recorders.
Whether someone reasonably believes, or should know, that they can
be "overheard" depends on their physical circumstances. For example, a
the California Court of Appeal in Wilkins v. NBC,216 expressly applying the
O'Laskey standard to a section 632 claim, also reasoned that waiters and
others in an open restaurant clearly could overhear what the complaining
plaintiffs said, even though the other persons within earshot obviously were
not parties to the communications. 21 7 The plaintiffs in Wilkins apparently
made no effort to speak quietly or in any way conceal their
communications from others that obviously were present. Such an open
setting should present the paradigmatic occasion for one to be "overheard."
Flanagan focuses on "simultaneous dissemination to an unannounced
second auditor," suggesting that "announced second auditors" would
eliminate liability.21 8 Thus, if the term "confidential" is to have a shred of
meaning, the potential for liability must be eliminated when at least one
obvious auditor can overhear the parties to a communication.
C. Determining Who Is a "Party"
Like "confidential" and "overhear," the term "party" must be limited
if it is to have any meaning. A limitation is implied in the facts of Frio,
Coulter v. Bank ofAmerica,219 and Flanagan. The court in Frio noted that
all of the communications in that case were conducted by telephone "on a
one-on-one basis. 220 In Coulter, the court found it significant that most of
the conversations at issue were held "in private offices with no one else
present," and that all of the forty conversations in that case either were one-
on-one in person or on the telephone.2  In Flanagan, all of the recorded
216. 84 Cal. Rptr. 329 (Ct. App. 1999).
217. Id. at 336.
218. Flanagan, 41 P.3d at 581 (emphasis added).
219. 33 Cal. Rptr. 766 (Ct. App. 1994).
220. Frio, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 823.
221. Coulter, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 768, 771 (emphasis added).
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telephone conversations were between two family members.
222
To date, California courts have not determined who can be called a
"party" to a communication under section 632. The issue is important
because whether one is a "party" to a communication can impact whether
one can "overhear" the communication for the purpose of avoiding
liability. For example, consider the following:
* X and Y are co-workers and are riding in an elevator
together. Z, a third co-worker, enters the elevator and
begins speaking to Y about an invoice. X works in a
different department and has no role in filling invoices.
X is carrying a recording device under his coat. Y
knows about the recording device, but Z does not.
* A is a broker holding a seminar on how to invest in the
stock market. The seminar is open to anyone upon the
payment of an entry fee. Dozens of people attend A's
seminar. X is one of the people in attendance, and he is
using a device in his briefcase to record A's seminar.
* X and Y are sitting together in a doctor's office. The
doctor, Z, walks in, introduces himself to Y, and
proceeds to examine Y. The doctor never speaks
directly to X and X never speaks directly to Z, not even
to introduce one another. X and Y are undercover
reporters and X is carrying a secret recording device.
Can X reasonably be considered a "party" to the communications in
any of the foregoing examples? If X is a party, then his secret recordings
arguably are not consented to by all parties, and therefore are illegal under
California law. If, on the other hand, X is not a party, then he is one who
has "overheard" the communications and therefore cannot be held liable for
his recordings. In each of the preceding examples, X was a passive, silent,
obvious presence and was not the direct object of anyone's thoughts or
communication. In such cases, as well as others, X cannot reasonably be
considered a "party" to any communication. An interpretation to the
contrary makes "party," "overheard" and "confidential" completely useless
terms.
222. Flanagan, 41 P.3d at 578.
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D. Society Is Served by Newsgatherers' Secret Taping When the Public
Interest Is at Stake.
A balancing of interests requires a weighing of one right against
another. The right of persons in California to be free from secret
recordings is not absolute. For example, California Penal Code section
633.5 declares:
Nothing in [the Privacy Act] prohibits one party to a confidential
communication from recording the communication for the
purpose of obtaining evidence reasonably believed to relate to
the commission by another party to that communication of the
crime of extortion, kidnapping, bribery, any felony involving
violence against a person, or a violation of Section 653m.
22 3
The statute is an explicit recognition that we, as a society, do not find
it in our interests to prohibit all surreptitious recording of conversations. In
more tangible terms, if a party reasonably believes that the communication
will relate to the commission of specified crimes, she may wire herself in
224order to record the conversation.
Since it may not reasonably be debated that the California Legislature
has expressed that eavesdropping is, under some circumstances, not a bad
act, the question is whether those limited circumstances set forth in Penal
Code section 633.5 are the only circumstances under which secret
audiotaping should be allowed. The answer-rooted in the powerful
constitutional tradition and mandate that basic rights should be carefully
balanced against one another on a case by case basis-is an emphatic "no."
News gatherers should be allowed to engage in secret audiotaping
when exercising their special role as sources of information for the
citizenry. Thomas Jefferson, in a letter to Edward Carrington dated
January 16, 1787, declared his passionate faith in the press:
The people are the only censors of their governors: and even
their heirs will tend to keep these to the true principles of their
institution. To punish these errors too severely would be to
suppress the only safeguard of the public liberty. The way to
prevent these irregular interpositions of the people is to give
223. CAL. PENAL CODE § 633.5. Section 653m proscribes annoying and obscene,
threatening, or anonymous phone calls. Id. § 653m.
224. See, e.g., People v. Montgomery, 132 Cal. Rptr. 558 (Ct. App. 1976) (permitting a
councilman who was subject of alleged bribe attempt by defendant to record their telephone
conversation); People v. Wojahn, 337 P.2d 192 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959) (holding legal a rape
victim's use of a concealed microphone on her person to secure incriminating evidence against
the defendant doctor that had raped her on a prior office visit).
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them full information of their affairs thro' the channel of the
public papers, and to contrive that those papers should penetrate
the whole mass of the people .... [W]ere it left to me to decide
whether we should have a government without newspapers, or
newspapers without a government, I should not hesitate a
moment to prefer the latter. But I should mean that every man
should receive those papers and be capable of reading them.
2 25
It is apparent that, if Jefferson had been able to foretell the advent of
television, he would have applauded advances in the democratic process
dramatically achieved by allowing every person to receive the news in an
understandable fashion.
The "Fourth Estate" is the turn of phrase devised to reflect the notion
that the press is equal to the branches that govern a truly democratic state,
an estate equally responsible for contributing to wise policy and law-
making as its three governmental counterparts.226 It is frequently attributed
to the nineteenth-century historian, Thomas Carlyle, though he himself
seems to have attributed it to Edmund Burke:
227
Burke said there were "Three Estates in Parliament; but, in the
Reporters' Gallery yonder, there sat a Fourth Estate more
important than they all. It is not a figure of speech, or a witty
saying; it is a literal fact ... Printing, which comes necessarily
out of Writing, I say often, is equivalent to Democracy: invent
Writing, Democracy is inevitable.... Whoever can speak,
speaking now to the whole nation, becomes a power, a branch of
government, with inalienable weight in law-making, in all acts
of authority. It matters not what rank he has, what revenues or
garnitures: the requisite thing is that he have a tongue which
others will listen to; this and nothing more is requisite.228
The special role of the press using modern techniques has also been
recognized. Justice Potter Stewart of the United States Supreme Court
recognized the peculiar illuminating power of taped recordings and the role
they play in the special democratic function of the press. 229 He also
articulated that the press in certain circumstances must be allowed to record
225. 11 THOMAS JEFFERSON, THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 49 (Julian P. Boyd ed.,
Princeton Univ. Press 1955) (Jan. 1, 1787-Aug. 6, 1787).
226. See THOMAS CARLYLE, ON HEROES, HERO-WORSHIP, AND THE HEROIC IN HISTORY
164 (New York, Charles Scribner's Sons 1897) (Edinburgh, Univ. Press 1841).
227. The sobriquet is also alternatively thought to have been coined in France, adding it to
the other three "estates": the aristocracy, the church and the bourgeoisie. See id.
228. Id. at 349-50.
229. Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 17 (1978) (Stewart, J., concurring in the
judgment).
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and report by being allowed into areas that the general public cannot enter:
When on assignment, a journalist does not [act] simply for his
own edification. He is there to gather information to be passed
on to others, and his mission is protected by the Constitution for
very specific reasons. "Enlightened choice by an informed
citizenry is the basic ideal upon which an open society is
premised." Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 726 (dissenting
opinion). Our society depends heavily on the press for that
enlightenment. Though not without its lapses, the press "has
been a mighty catalyst in awakening public interest in
governmental affairs, exposing corruption among public officers
and employees and generally informing the citizenry of public
events and occurrences . . . ." Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 539.
See Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 219; Grosjean v. American
Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250.
That the First Amendment speaks separately of freedom of
speech and freedom of the press is no constitutional accident,
but an acknowledgment of the critical role played by the press in
American society. The Constitution requires sensitivity to that
role, and to the special needs of the press in performing it
effectively. A person touring Santa Rita jail can grasp its reality
with his own eyes and ears. But if a television reporter is to
convey the jail's sights and sounds to those who cannot
personally visit the place, he must use cameras and sound
equipment. In short, terms of access that are reasonably
imposed on individual members of the public may, if they
impede effective reporting without sufficient justification, be
unreasonable as applied to journalists who are there to convey to
the general public what the visitors see.230
In another concurring opinion, Justice Byron White expressed the
rationale for why someone recording his own conversation should not be
penalized:
When one man speaks to another he takes all the risks ordinarily
inherent in so doing, including the risk that the man to whom he
speaks will make public what he has heard. The Fourth
Amendment does not protect against unreliable (or law-abiding)
associates.... It is but a logical and reasonable extension of this
principle that a man take the risk that his hearer, free to
memorize what he hears for later verbatim repetitions, is instead
230. Id.
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recording it or transmitting it to another.,
231
Another concept that cries out for recognition in the analysis of
whether news gatherers can surreptitiously record is the recognition that the
right of privacy should not stand above other rights of equal or greater
dignity, such as freedom of speech or freedom of the press. Some thinkers
even believe that privacy should be ignored altogether: "[A]n indifference
to privacy.. i s... thought by some to be... desirable.... People who
hold this view claim that institutions of privacy are conducive to social
hypocrisy, interpersonal exploitation through deception, and even asocial
or antisocial loyalties.
' 212
The idea that "interpersonal exploitation through deception" may be
the result of too much exulting of the right of privacy is a construct that
cannot be ignored. "The right of privacy stands on high ground, cognate to
the values and concerns protected by constitutional guarantees. But this
must be accommodated to the need for reasonable latitude for the selection
of topics for discussion in newspapers. That right of the press, likewise
supported by constitutional guarantees, is crucial to the vitality of
democracy. The courts are called upon here as elsewhere in the law, to
harmonize individual rights and community interests.,
233
The balancing of the rights of privacy with the equally heavy right
that the public has to know of potentially harmful information that affects it
requires significant flexibility and case-by-case analyses. Some
information simply cannot be classified as "nobody else's business." In
dealing with credit agencies or banks, it is clear that much information is
the business of other people. This is true for the private matters we relate
to our doctors and lawyers as well. Persons holding themselves out to do
business with the public, for example, those providing the populace with
goods, services, and advice, cannot keep everything private, certainly not
their malfeasance or shoddy goods. Anyone dealing with these purveyors
has a legitimate concern as to matters affecting the joint business
transactions and much more. A person is free to choose whether to enter
231. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 363 n.* (1967) (White, J., concurring) (internal
citation omitted); see also United States v. DeVore, 423 F.2d 1069, 1074 (4th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 402 U.S. 950 (1970) (holding that, when a defendant has a conversation with another
person, he relinquishes his right of privacy with respect to that person because "it necessarily
must follow that a recording of what was said may either be used to corroborate the revelation, or
simply as a more accut[sic] means of disclosure'"").
232. See Ferdinand Schoeman, Privacy: Philosophical Dimensions of the Literature, in
PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY: AN ANTHOLOGY 6 (Ferdinand David Schoeman ed.,
1984).
233. Afro-American Pub 'g Co. v. Jaffe, 366 F.2d 649, 654 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (en bane)
(footnote omitted).
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into those types of transactions, but they cannot enter into them without
expecting that a degree of privacy will have to be given up, sometimes on
both sides.
It even can be said that there is a universal human tendency to invade
the privacy of others and "of society to engage in surveillance to guard
against anti-social conduct., 234 Although Warren and Brandeis in 1890,235
and thousands of persons since, have expressed outrage at the public's
insatiability to learn things about other people, the tendency to want to
know should come as no surprise. Curiosity is a human trait that can in no
way be arbitrarily or universally denominated immoral:
Though the degree to which action will be taken to satisfy
human curiosity varies according to cultural and personality
factors, men and women in all primitive societies try to find out
what has been happening to members of their own family, other
villagers, other tribal members, and so forth. Gossip, which is
only a particular way of obtaining private information to satisfy
curiosity, seems to be found in all societies. People want to
know what others are doing, especially the great and the
powerful, partly as a means of gauging their own performances
and desires and partly as a means of vicarious experience, for by
satisfying curiosity the individual experiences a sense of
pleasure from knowing about exciting or awesome behavior in
others.236
In these days of terrorism, domestic bombings, anthrax scares,
kidnappings, snipers, and corporate scandals, one cannot deny that the
tendency or desire of some individuals to keep information from the rest of
us is not a value that we may wish universally to admire and protect. If any
one of these recent horrors had been exposed by secret audiotaping by a
journalist, no one would be crying out about the "insatiable public" and a
"pandering press."
Judge Posner of the Seventh Circuit is well-known to apply economic
analysis to many areas of the law, including "to explore the dissemination
and withholding of information in personal as well as business contexts,
and thus to deal with such matters as prying, eavesdropping 'self-
advertising,' and gossip. '237 He states that .... [p]eople invariably possess
234. ALAN F. WESTIN, The Origins of Modern Claims to Privacy, in PRIVACY AND
FREEDOM 8, 19 (1967).
235. See generally Warren & Brandeis, supra note 23.
236. WESTIN, supra note 234, at 19.
237. Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of Privacy, in PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS
OF PRIVACY: AN ANTHOLOGY 333 (Ferdinand David Schoeman ed., 1984). One does not have to
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information, including the contents of communications and facts about
themselves, that they will incur costs to conceal." 238 Continuing, he says
that .... [s]ometimes such information is of value to other people-that is,
other people will incur costs to discover it [and] [t]hus we have two
economic goods, 'privacy' and 'prying.' ' 239 Posner goes on to state:
The strongest defenders of privacy usually define the
individual's right to privacy as the right to control the flow of
information about him. A seldom-remarked corollary to a right
to misrepresent one's character is that others have a legitimate
interest in unmasking the misrepresentation.
Yet some of the demand for private information about other
people seems mysteriously disinterested-for example, that of
the readers of newspaper gossip columns, whose "idle curiosity"
has been deplored, groundlessly in my opinion. Gossip columns
recount the personal lives of wealthy and successful people
whose tastes and habits offer models-that is, yield information -
to the ordinary person in making consumption, career, and other
decisions. The models are not always positive. The story of
Howard Hughes, for example, is usually told as a morality play,
warning of the pitfalls of success. That does not make it any
less educational. The fascination with the notorious and the
criminal - with John Profumo and with Nathan Leopold - has a
similar basis. Gossip columns open people's eyes to
opportunities and dangers; they are genuinely informative.
... There is apparently very little privacy in poor societies,
where, consequently, people can readily observe at first hand the
intimate lives of others. Personal surveillance is costlier in
wealthier societies, both because people live in conditions that
give them greater privacy and because the value (and hence
opportunity cost) of time is greater - too great, in fact, to make
the expenditure of a lot of it in watching the neighbors a
worthwhile pursuit. An alternative method of informing oneself
about how others live was sought by the people and provided by
the press. A legitimate and important function of the press is to
agree with the application of the economic theory nor Judge Posner's conclusions to admire the
elegance and clarity of his thinking regarding the balancing of rights. He bemoans the lack of
rigor in this area. "Discussions of the privacy questions have contained a high degree of cant,
sloganeering, emotion, and loose thinking." Id. at 345.
238. Id. at 333.
239. Id. at 333-34.
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provide specialization in prying in societies where the costs of
obtaining information have become too great for the Nosy
Parker.
.... It is no answer that, in Brandeis's phrase, people have "the
right to be let alone." Few people want to be let alone. They
want to manipulate the world around them by selective
disclosure of facts about themselves. Why should others be
asked to take their self-serving claims at face value and
prevented from obtaining the information necessary to verify or
disprove these claims?1
40
The answer is obvious. We should not be forced to take self-serving
claims at face value and be prevented from verifying or disproving claims
that are important, even vital, to our lives. The press has a long history of
being tenacious and motivated in bringing to light matters that some people
wished that others would accept at face value.241 One author has even
asserted that the public likes the idea of crusading reporters who stand up
for the community and go where they cannot go.
242
The United States Senate recognized this need to permit procedures
for attaining sufficient information and allowing the press to act as a proxy
in doing so. 243 In amending the Electronic Communications and Privacy
Act of 1986,244 reacting to a case decided earlier, the Senate Committee
report expressed the policy rationale for giving the press the leeway to
record conversations. 245 The Act is a one-party statute, allowing one party
to the conversation to consent to secret recording.246 However, under
certain circumstances, that consent is invalid. At the time of the earlier
case, Boddie v. ABC,247 one-party interception was allowable under the Act
240. Id. at 334-35, 335, 338.
241. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (Pentagon Papers
case); Landmark Comm., Inc., v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978) (sanctioning a newspaper and its
sources for publishing charges of incompetence against a juvenile court judge even though they
came from confidential judicial disciplinary proceeding); Dateline: High Wire Acts (NBC
television broadcast, Oct. 27, 1995) (recording company executives instructing on high-pressure
techniques, usually used on senior citizens, to donate to non-existent relief efforts, leading to
indictments in United States v. Burr, No. 95-1876-B (S.D. Cal. 1995); Dateline: Sweating It Out
(NBC television broadcasts on Sept. 24 and Oct. 20, 1996) (documenting disregard of safety,
wage, and immigration laws in garment industry); The Action News (KCBS-TV, Los Angeles,
May 19-23, 1991) (showing recruitment of the reporter to file a bogus workers' compensation).
242. Neil Hickey, Where TV Has Teeth, COLUM. JOUR. REV., May/June 2001, at 42.
243. See S. REP. No. 99-541, at 17, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3571 [hereinafter
SENATE REPORT].
244. 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2000).
245. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 243, at 17-18.
246. See discussion supra Part II.
247. 731 F.2d 333 (6th Cir. 1984).
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"unless such communication is intercepted for the purpose of committing
any criminal or tortiuous act in violation of the Constitution or laws of the
United States or of any State for the purpose of committing any other
injurious act. ' '21 In the Boddie matter, a broadcasting network had secretly
recorded a person allegedly involved in a scandal based on allegations that
249a judge granted leniency to female defendants in return for sexual favors.
The plaintiff granted an interview but did not know he was being
recorded.250 This is what a Congressional committee said about it:
While the appeals court decision in Boddie merely sent the case
back for further factual development, it is clear from the facts of
the case that the term "improper purpose" is overly broad and
vague. The court's opinion suggests that if the network intended
to cause "insult and injury" to plaintiff Boddie, she might be
entitled to recover. This interpretation of the statute places a
stumbling block in the path of even the most scrupulous
journalist. Many news stories have been brought to light by
recording a conversation with the consent of any one of the
parties involved - often the journalist himself. Many news
stories are embarrassing to someone. The present wording of
section 251 l(2)(d) not only provides such a person with a right
to bring suit, but it also makes the actions of the journalist a
potential criminal offense under section 2511, even if the
interception was made in the ordinary course of responsible
news-gathering activities and not for the purpose of committing
a criminal act or a tort. Such a threat is inconsistent with the
guarantees of the first amendment.
251
The Act was amended by deleting the words "for the purpose of
committing any other injurious act," thus reducing the threat to legitimate
newsgathering.
Although the Act is federal law and a state like California may
impose limitations on its citizens' conduct on independent grounds, it may
not do so if the limitations are unconstitutional. The Senate clearly felt that
uncertain language in the Act in question threatened "responsible news-
gathering activities," that is, the gathering of information about a highly
newsworthy event.252 This does not lead to the conclusion that all such
restrictions are unconstitutional, but does recognize a strong policy
248. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d) (emphasis added).
249. Boddie, 731 F.2d at 335.
250. Id.
251. SENATE REPORT, supra note 243, at 17 (emphasis added).
252. Id.
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preference for allowing responsible and scrupulous newsgathering.
In Bartnicki v. Vopper,253 the United States Supreme Court decided
the question of "whether, in cases where information has been acquired
unlawfully by a newspaper or by a source, government may ever punish not
only the unlawful acquisition, but the ensuing publication as well., 254 In
Bartnicki, persons whose cellular telephone conversation had been
intercepted and taped by some unknown third party sued media defendants
who had obtained the tape without knowing the original source, but
knowing that it had to have been intercepted illegally.255  During
contentious collective-bargaining negotiations between a union
representing teachers at a Pennsylvania high school and the local school
board, the unidentified person intercepted and recorded a cell phone
conversation between the chief union negotiator and the union president.
2 5 6
The media defendants broadcast the tape 257 and the plaintiffs sued,
asserting claims under Federal and Pennsylvania wiretapping acts.258
Those acts made not only the interception of conversations illegal, but the
publication of information so gained as well.
The Court refrained from deciding a broader question of whether the
publication of the truth could ever be punished consistent with the First
Amendment, stating: .... We continue to believe that the sensitivity and
significance of the interests presented in clashes between [the] First
Amendment and privacy rights counsel relying on limited principles that
259sweep no more broadly than the appropriate context of the instant case.
This is the voice of moderation and modulation. It is not clear that a
similar diffidence was in the California Supreme Court's mind when
deciding Flanagan. As discussed throughout this Article, the Court gave
no clear signal of whether it would decide a secret recording matter
differently, if presented with a media case reporting on a matter of public
interest.
Bartnicki held "that a stranger's illegal conduct does not suffice to
remove the First Amendment shield from speech about a matter of public
concern" and that the no-publication rules of the statutes were
unconstitutional. 260 The outcome in Bartnicki is pertinent to the thesis of
253. 532 U.S. 514 (2001).
254. Id. at 528.
255. Id. at 517-18.
256. Id. at 518.
257. Thus, the case did not involve illegal reporting, but rather publication after obtaining a
tape not illegally gathered by the publisher.
258. Id. at 520.
259. Id. at 529 (quoting Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 533 (1989)).
260. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 535.
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this Article urging balancing of societal interests on a case by case basis,
taking into consideration that society is well-served on some occasions by
breaches of otherwise protected confidentiality, particularly when the
persons engaged in the breach are acting in a constitutional capacity in the
public interest.
Justice Breyer, in a concurring opinion joined by Justice O'Connor,
stated that the type of statements made by the participants to the
conversation simply was not of the kind that could be considered private:
[T]he speakers had little or no legitimate interest in maintaining
the privacy of the particular conversation. That conversation
involved a suggestion about "blow[ing] off.., front porches"
and "do[ing] some work on some of these guys," thereby raising
a significant concern for the safety of others. Where publication
of private information constitutes a wrongful act, the law
recognizes a privilege allowing the reporting of threats to public
safety.261
The constant chord sounding throughout all of the cases and other
sources quoted above supports the idea that Flanagan cannot possibly-
and should not-be interpreted so narrowly as to halt all secret recording of
conversations by newsgatherers.
A leading case relating to society's views on expectations of privacy
occurred in Desnick v. ABC, Inc.262 Although not a California case, the
California Supreme Court referred to this Seventh Circuit decision in one
major opinion on secret recording by the press.263 In Desnick, a television
network surreptitiously video and audiotaped patient consultations taking
place inside an eye clinic. 264 The issue was whether the network and its
employees had violated state wiretapping statutes.265 Judge Posner, writing
for the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, construed the Wisconsin and
Illinois wiretapping statutes in such a way that the surreptitious taping by
the network was outside the scope of those statutes.266 Among other things,
the statutes required that the recording be done with the purpose to commit
a crime, or a tort or other injurious acts.267 The Court found that the
recording had not been done with the purpose to commit any of those
proscribed acts, stating that "[t]elling the world the truth about a Medicare
261. Id. at 539 (citation omitted).
262. 44 F.3d 1345 (7th Cir. 1995).
263. Sanders v. ABC, Inc., 978 P.2d 67, 76-77 (Cal. 1999).
264. Desnick, 44 F.3d at 1348.
265. Id. at 1353.
266. Id. at 1353-1354.
267. Id. at 1353.
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fraud is hardly what the framers of the statute had in mind in forbidding a
person to record his own conversations if he was trying to commit an
'injurious act.'
' 268
The surreptitious taping occurred in a business setting-an eye clinic.
There was no communication that included "intimate personal facts
concerning the two individual plaintiffs." The only conversations were
with the defendant's employees. 269 The purpose of the reporters was to see
if the physicians would recommend unnecessary medical procedures. 70 In
Desnick, two more elements that might make up the compound of privacy
were put into the crucible: whether the taping took place on business
premises and whether reporters did what they did to uncover fraud on the
part of the business owners.27 ' The case is an excellent example of how
courts outside California have viewed secret audiotaping by news
gatherers.
In a case recently decided, Hornberger v. ABC, Inc.,272 the Appellate
Division of the New Jersey Superior Court considered the New Jersey
statute that makes it a crime to intercept any oral communication or
disclose it, where "oral communication" is one uttered by a person
exhibiting an expectation that such communication is not subject to
interception under circumstances justifying such expectation. 273  There,
three African-American men or "testers," agreed to cruise in an expensive
car to find out if the police would stop them. Plaintiff officers stopped the
car for a minor traffic violation, ordered the three men from the car, and
searched the car, all of which was surreptitiously recorded by the network
and later broadcast under the title "Driving While Black.,
274
The three-judge court synthesized cases throughout the United States
dealing precisely with the issue faced by the Flanagan court and came out
strongly on the other side of the fence, finding that the police officers did
not have a reasonable expectation of privacy during the search:
[A] few courts have distinguished between a reasonable
expectation of privacy and a reasonable expectation that one's
conversation will not be recorded. Boddie v. ABC, 731 F.2d 333,
339 (6th Cir.1984) (defendant-journalist filmed a participant in a
scandal, without her consent); Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573,
268. Id. at 1353-54.
269. Id. at 1345.
270. Desnick, 44 F.3d at 1355.
271. See id. at 1348.
272. 799 A.2d 566 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002).
273. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:156A-2(b) (West 1985).
274. 799 A.2d at 571-72.
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1579 (11 th Cir. 1990) (a Post Office supervisor intercepted oral
communications of a letter carrier); Angel v. Williams, 12 F.3d
786, 790 (8th Cir.1993) (plaintiffs-police officers accused of
using excessive force on a prisoner alleged that an audio
recording of the incident violated the federal Act).
The standard set forth in these latter three cases seems unduly
restrictive. Few conversations occur in which the participants
expect that their speech will be intercepted. (Intercept is defined
as "the aural or other acquisition of the contents of any ... oral
communication through the use of any electronic, mechanical or
other device." N.J.S.A. 2A:156A-2(c).) Under the more
restrictive standard, almost every oral communication,
including shouting in a crowded public place, would be
protected against interception, disclosure of its contents, and
use of its contents. N.J.S.A. 2A: 156A-3.
The majority of courts which have considered this issue, as well
as the most recent decisions, have adopted the reasonabld-
expectation-of-privacy standard. Though the Eighth and
Eleventh circuits applied the expectation-of-non- interception
test in Angel v. Williams and Walker v. Darby, more recent
decisions in both circuits have used the expectation-of-privacy
test, without acknowledging or discussing the expectation-of-
non-interception standard or any difference between the two.
See U.S. v. Peoples, 250 F.3d 630 (8th Cir.2001), and U.S. v.
McKinnon, 985 F.2d 525, 527 (11 th Cir.1993).2 75
Following Flanagan, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently
affirmed a district court's decision to grant summary judgment to a media
entity accused of, among other things, tortiously invading the privacy of the
owner of a medical laboratory that allegedly misread pap smears. 76
Because the federal court's subject matter jurisdiction rested on diversity
jurisdiction, the intrusion upon seclusion claim was evaluated under
Arizona law. 77 However, due to the paucity of Arizona law on privacy
issues, the court extensively cited California decisions, including Shulman
v. Group W Productions, Inc., 78 and Sanders, but the court never
mentioned Flanagan.279 Although the court looked to California law, it
also recognized that California law was more protective of privacy rights
275. Id. at 591-92 (emphasis added to text only).
276. Medical Lab. Mgmt. Consultants v. ABC, Inc., 306 F.3d 806 (9th Cir.2002).
277. Id. at 812.
278. 955 P.2d 469 (Cal. 1998).
279. See Medical Lab., at 815-18.
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than Arizona law.280  Nevertheless, the court reasoned that even under
California's treatment of privacy laws, the owner had no reasonable
expectation of privacy:
However, even if we assume that the Arizona Supreme Court
would embrace an interest in limited privacy as broad as that
articulated by the California Supreme Court, we still conclude
that as a matter of law [the owner's] privacy expectation was not
reasonable. The expectation of limited privacy in a
communication-namely the expectation that communication
shared with, or possibly overheard by, a limited group of
persons will nonetheless remain relatively private and secluded
from the public at large-is reasonable only to the extent that
the communication conveys information private and personal to
the declarant. [citations omitted] Shulman and Sanders, the two
California Supreme Court opinions addressing the interest in
limited privacy, are illustrative of this point. Both opinions
recognized the limited privacy interest in the context of private
and personal communications that were interpreted by the
281press.
In evaluating whether the owner had a reasonable expectation of
privacy, the Ninth Circuit examined the "location" of his conversations
with undercover ABC reporters carrying hidden cameras and posing as a
cytotechnologist and a computer expert.282 The court determined that there
was no reasonable expectation of privacy in the owner's decision to invite
strangers to the administrative offices of his "semi-public place of
business.' 28 3 The court also noted that the conversations "did not involve
[the owner's] private or personal affairs," and therefore that the owner "did
not have an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of
the conversation., 284  Simply put, the court held that ABC's "covert
videotaping of a business conversation among strangers in business offices
does not rise to the level of an exceptional prying into another's private
affairs., 285 It is also worth noting that the Ninth Circuit determined that
ABC's broadcast was about "a subject of unquestionable concern-the
frequency of testing errors by medical laboratories that analyze women's
280. Id. at 816; see also id. at 815-16 (noting the "significant difference between California
and Arizona law in the area of electronic eavesdropping").
281. Id. at 816.
282. Id. 810, 813-14.
283. Id. at 813-14.
284. Id. at 814.
285. Medical Lab., 306 F.3d at 819.
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pap smear slides for cervical cancer."
28 6
There unquestionably is a strong strain in the law governing secret
recording that favors allowing news gatherers to disseminate important
information in pursuit of First Amendment goals. When a conversation
occurs that is a matter of high public concern, particularly when harm to
others is present or on the horizon, a rule that mandates punishment of
secret recording by news gatherers just because the person recorded
thought he was speaking only to persons or people around him is contrary
to First Amendment values, a large body of law, concepts of the need for
balancing of competing values and a desire to protect society. One has
only to consider whether we as a nation would have criminally prosecuted
the press for unearthing in advance any of the destructive conduct,
September 11 being only one example, occupying our minds and hearts
over the past decade. A contrary rule like the one in Flanagan helps leaves
us all at risk.
Still, one may conscionably ask, Why allow the press to secretly
record? Or, Why not rely upon our law enforcement agencies? There are
several answers to this query. First, law enforcement agencies are spread
too thin and only deal with matters like triage in a French field hospital.
Not enough money exists in any municipal, state or federal budget to ferret
out all of the wrongdoing that harms people every day. Second, law
enforcement and other agencies of the government are frequently the
targets of the secret recording. In California, for instance, officers on a
routine stop may now feel that they could not be recorded like the officers
in New Jersey. Consider also the fortuitous recording of the Rodney King
beating. If the tape had included sound, the cameraman might have been
guilty of a crime under Flanagan. The social reward to encourage
government observation of wrongdoing is not nearly sufficient to achieve
the beneficial goals that are served by scrupulous investigative reporting.
Finally, the press is a much safer secret recorder than any government
agency. The power of the market keeps it largely under control in its
investigative capacity.
The press has influence upon people and government only insofar as
it can persuade listeners and readers. It lacks any coercive power
whatsoever. It cannot cause any change in government or social policy
without convincing the electorate that change is necessary. It has been said
that the press is not elected by anybody. In fact, its conduct is subject to
election by a gigantic jury. The press is elected by its viewers and readers.
If secret recording by the press fails at its job because the public is
286. Id. at 821.
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affronted by secret recording, the producers and the publishers will be the
first to pull back. And, all importantly, the press cannot exercise police
power over anyone, but rather can only publish information. Truth itself
coerces no one, but responds to the demands of viewers and readers.
Further, if the rule regarding secret recording is that it may not be
done by any private person if the party recorded has a reasonable
expectation of privacy, there can and will be no wholesale rush for the
press to secretly record. The limits imposed thereby are both rational and
restrictive. Given those limits, we as citizens should be happy that
investigators exist acting on our behalf with the resources, the training, and
the impetus to help ferret out bad meat, drunken doctors, corrupt judges,
abusive teachers, highway builders on the take, unabombers, racist cults,
unrestrainable priests, and, yes, lying journalists. If there is a legitimate
public interest in investigative reporting-and we doubt that any argument
can be mounted against it-then Flanagan, if it applies to the press at all,
has been wrongly decided.
The wrongheadedness of the Flanagan standard was best expressed
by the same court that devised it, in its own earlier opinions about privacy
where the media had recorded conversations:
In deciding, therefore, whether a reporter's alleged intrusion into
private matters (i.e., physical space, conversation or data) is
"offensive" and hence actionable as an invasion of privacy,
courts must consider the extent to which the intrusion was,
under the circumstances, justified by the legitimate motive of
gathering the news. Information collecting techniques that may
be highly offensive when done for socially unprotected
reasons-for purposes of harassment, blackmail or prurient
curiosity, for example-may not be offensive to a reasonable
person when employed by journalists in pursuit of a socially or
politically important story.287
[W]e do not hold or imply that investigative journalists
necessarily commit a tort by secretly recording events and
conversations in offices, stores or other work places. Whether a
reasonable expectation or privacy is violated by such recording
depends on the exact nature of the conduct and all the
surrounding circumstances. In addition, liability under the
intrusion tort requires that the invasion be highly offensive to a
reasonable person, considering, among other factors the motive
287. Shulman, 955 P.2d at 493.
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of the alleged intruder.288
No sound reason exists for finding that eavesdropping by a
newsgatherer should be balanced upon the scale of justice against the right
of privacy only if a journalist is sued at common law, but not if she is sued
for violation of a statute for the identical acts. Courts, lawyers, parties, and
the people are not served by such a discrepancy.
V. CONCLUSION
Looking back at Flanagan v. Flanagan in an attempt to navigate
uncharted waters, the condition of that leaky vessel must be kept in mind.
The Flanagan family was, in the popular parlance of the day, dysfunctional.
A son and a mother each claimed they had been secretly recorded while on
the telephone in a dispute about wills, money, and an alleged desire to kill a
husband.
That domestic squabble formed the murk out of which the California
Supreme Court attempted to forge a bright-line rule to guide court and
counsel in approaching thousands of fact situations that differ so markedly
from the recordings made there that the compass was certain to be flawed.
One of the flaws that will continue to generate great uncertainty is that the
rule conflicts with the very principles set forth in two earlier decisions by
the same court, thus giving rise to anomalies that seem to impose disparate
liability depending on the cause of action alleged in plaintiffs complaint.
The holding of Flanagan, if restricted to its peculiar facts as it should
be, only applies to the recording of telephone conversations between
private parties not engaging in and of the classically democratic and
traditional functions of the press. However, the breadth of the language is
alarming. The rule laid out in that case should not apply to news gatherers
using hidden recording devices to report on matters of public interest in
situations in which the parties have no reasonable expectation that the
words they are speaking will not be repeated to others. Although news
gatherers must proceed with caution, there are strong arguments that the
Flanagan family spat should not be the occasion for establishing policy
governing our society in attempting to uncover the truth about vital, even
life-threatening, issues.
288. Sanders, 978 P.2d at 69.
